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ABSTRACT 
The bankruptcy of the communist ideology left Russia in 
an uncomfortable position at the top of falling Empire. This 
new geopolitical reality had demanded redefinition of the 
Russian national interests and goals. Recovering from the 
shock of the lost Cold War lasted in Russia almost a decade, 
and was symbolically ended when the old and ailing President 
Yeltsin was replaced by young and active Putin. Under 
President Putin the Russian policy adopted some 
characteristics of radical nationalism, neo-imperialism and 
Great Power sentiments. This thesis examines how the Russian 
foreign policy strategy was developed and used as a tool for 
exertion of influence over the post-communist states, 
particularly Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia. The Balance of 
Power model of international relations serves as the 
theoretical framework to draw conclusion from the research, 
and to formulate some policy recommendations for the 
examined countries. Each case study is organized around 
evaluation of four dimensions of state power, namely 
diplomacy, information, military, and economy (DIME). The 
adopted approach to assess these four fields assumes that 
there are both conventional and unconventional mechanisms 
used by Russia in each of these fields. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The collapse of the Soviet communist bloc and 
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union was 
undoubtedly one of the most significant political events of 
the 20th century. As a consequence, the world’s political 
map was populated by many newly emerged states-the former 
Soviet republics, e.g., Ukraine or Georgia including Russia 
itself. In turn, the former members of the communist bloc 
were given a historical opportunity to break its ties with 
the Russian hegemon, and to start pursuing independent 
policy, in order to seek for them a proper place in the 
international community. One of the most prominent countries 
from this group of states was Poland. 
The geopolitical location of Poland never favored it. 
Located between two powerful neighbors, Germany and Russia, 
Poland has had to struggle many times for its survival. The 
last episode of this struggle took place in 1989, when 
Poland freed itself from Russian dominance. Since that time, 
Poland has tried to do its best to secure for itself a 
proper place in the community of the democratic countries. 
Those efforts were reflected in joining North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (UE). 
Establishing a foreign policy based on equality, 
democracy and mutual respect with Polish neighbors is 
considered as one of the most crucial parts of the Polish 
national security strategy. From this point of view, the 
relationship with Russia has a special meaning for Poland. 
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However, there is little evidence that Russian policymakers 
have abandoned the communist doctrine of the near abroad.1 
Instead, there are numerous examples suggesting that Russia 
is attempting to sustain its zone of influence over Poland. 
Moreover, it seems that Poland is not the only former 
communist state having problems establishing a good 
relationship with Russia. This has been an issue for the 
Baltic States, Azerbaijan, the Ukraine and Georgia. 
That Russia is again on the path to reestablish its 
zone of influence over the former communist bloc states is 
this thesis’ working hypothesis and a starting point for 
further research. The research in this work is based on the 
case study method, and is built around the examination of 
the Russian foreign policy towards Poland, Ukraine, and 
Georgia. These countries have been chosen as case studies in 
order to see the full-range of Russian foreign policy 
initiatives, a state previously independent but dominated by 
the USSR (Poland) and two actual components of the former 
USSR (Georgia and Ukraine). Once the initial hypothesis is 
established, the research will be focused on examination of 
the underlying reasons for this Russian policy and 
identifying the mechanisms by which Moscow’s political goals 
are being attempted. 
The Balance of Power model of international relations 
serves as an analytical framework for the research made in 
this thesis. Based on the main assumptions of this model, 
                     
1 The term of “near abroad” refers to Soviet zone of influence. This 
zone contained almost all former communist countries, especially those 
ones geographically close to the Soviet Union. This term is commonly 
used by the Russian leaders to justify their attempts to influence the 
post—communist countries. William Safire, On Language; The Near Abroad, 
New York Times (May 22, 1994). 
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the attempt will be made to explain the main stipulations of 
the Russian foreign policy. The Balance of Power model will 
also serve as a point of reference in an attempt to draw 
some policy recommendations for Poland, Ukraine and Georgia, 
to counter the Russian foreign policy strategy. 
It can be argued that the value of this thesis lies in 
exposing the widely underestimated—especially in the Western 
Europe—challenge that Russia poses to the international 
order. The Russian efforts to regain a place among the 
world’s key players can destabilize some of the post–
communist countries with subsequent negative effects for 
international security. Moreover, this thesis identifies 
several “unconventional” mechanisms of exertion of influence 
over the examined countries used by Russia. Some of the 
identified mechanisms are not in compliance with democratic 
standards, which raise concerns about the condition of 
democracy in Russia itself and Russia’s credibility as a 
member of the family of democratic states. 
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the general 
mechanisms of the Russian foreign policy towards the former 
communist bloc countries, and to determine if there are 
workable strategies available for these countries to deal 
with the Russian pressure. The findings will allow answers 
to some specific research questions, which are listed below. 
• To what extent do the assumptions of the near 
abroad idea still determine the Russian foreign 
policy? 
• What are the Russian foreign policy goals in terms 
of global and local policy? 
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• Is the Russian foreign policy aiming at 
reestablishment of the Russia’s zone of influence? 
• What are the main mechanisms used by Russian 
authorities to influence neighboring countries? 
• What is the role of natural resources in the 
Russian foreign policy? 
• Are there any “unconventional” means 
available for Russia to exert influence over 
Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia? If so, what is 
the relationship between use of such means 
and democracy in Russia? Is the Russian 
democracy only a “managed democracy?”2 
• What are the main differences in the Russian 
policy toward Poland, Ukraine and Georgia? 
• Are there any policies or strategies available for 
the examined countries to counter Russia’s policy? 
• Do former communist bloc states currently pursue 
any coherent policy to handle the “Russian 
factor?” 
The working hypothesis of this thesis seeks to show 
that the Russian policy towards countries from the former 
Soviet camp is biased by the near abroad communist doctrine. 
This doctrine assumed that the Soviet Union had a right to 
interfere in internal issues of its allies, particularly the 
ones in its geographical proximity. Today, the heritage of 
the near abroad idea was strengthened by the Eurasianism 
ideas, which became extremely influential within the Russian 
political circles. It results in a situation where the 
present state of the relationships between Russia and 
countries which belonged to the former communist camp can be 
described as a sequence of minor crises, likely rooted in 
                     
2 By a “managed democracy” author means a political system where all 
the democratic institutions which constitute democracy are present, but 
democracy as a system is not functioning properly (e.g., Iran, Belarus 
or Venezuela). 
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the Russian neo−imperial policy. It seems that the Russian 
authorities’ goal is to reestablish or in some cases, to 
sustain their zone of influence over the near abroad. 
Assuming that it is true, the countries under examination 
(Poland, Ukraine and Georgia) have to face this challenge by 
adopting a workable strategy towards Russia. This thesis is 
an attempt to identify the mechanisms through which the 
Russian foreign policy works. Then, based on the findings, 
to determine what can be the most feasible foreign policy 
strategies for Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia, to protect 
their national interests. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To show the broad spectrum and multi-dimensional 
picture of the researched problem, the analysis will be 
organized around four dimensions of national power: 
Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME). The 
choice of this model, which is almost exclusively used by 
the U.S. Armed Forces,corresponds with the working hypothesis 
of this thesis that Russia is pursuing an aggressive policy. 
Hence, the use of the “militarized” construct and approach 
to the research problem seem to be relevant in terms of the 
Russian policy. 
According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command Glossary 
DIME are “areas of national power that are leveraged in 
‘effects-based’ operations against an adversary's 
vulnerabilities identified by Operational Net Assessment, 
and targeted against his will and capability to conduct 
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war.”3 So, according to the definition above, the national 
power can be used in these four areas in order to conduct 
organized operation against an adversary in order to 
compromise his ability to conduct war. This definition 
suggests that DIME can be perceived as a defensive tool 
against an adversary who is somewhat likely to wage a war 
now or in the future. This thesis will transcend this 
defensive meaning of the DIME, and will attempt to show that 
DIME can be used offensively to restore a state’s influence 
throughout its zone of interests. The other direction in 
which the classic definition of DIME will be expanded is 
rooted in the unique character of relationship between 
Russia and the examined countries. The fact that two of the 
examined countries were part of the Soviet Union contributes 
to the assumption that there are more than only 
“conventional”4 means of exertion available for Russia. This 
thesis examines the “unconventional” side of DIME and how 
Russia is using it. With regard to this, the findings 
highlight the importance of the communist heritage, which 
still shapes the present of the post-Soviet countries. 
Each case study is built of six main parts. The first 
one gives a short historical background for the relationship 
between Russia and examined country. The second to fifth 
parts examine the military, economic, diplomatic and 
                     
3 U.S. Joint Forces Command Glossary. DIME definition available 
online at http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#D (accessed July 16, 
2008). 
4 By “conventional means of exertion” author means all these tools 
available to certain country to influence other country, given that both 
countries have always been separate entities or at least for 
sufficiently long time (e.g., USA vs. Iran, USA vs. Venezuela or Great 
Britain vs. Argentina in 1982). The “conventional means of influence” 
can be referred also as “positive” influence (e.g., foreign investments 
in free market economy or cultural attractiveness). 
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information (DIME) aspects of the Russian policy 
respectively. Within each of those parts there is a section 
which refers to the “unconventional” dimension of certain 
areas of DIME. The last part draws a conclusion based on the 
findings made within each case study. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, including 
Introduction as a first chapter and Conclusion and Policy 
Recommendations as the sixth one. The body of this work 
consists of three chapters as follows: 
1. Chapter II - Theoretical Framework and the 
Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy Foundations 
This chapter will introduce a theoretical model of 
international relations known as the Balance of Power model. 
The main assumptions of this model will be examined, 
particularly with reference to the period of Cold War and 
the role of small states. This in turn will contribute to a 
better understanding of what were the initial conditions, 
which shaped the Russian policymakers’ minds for the foreign 
policy strategy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The second part of this chapter will be dedicated to 
the examination of the Russian foreign policy foundations 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union with particular focus 
on the Eurasianism idea. 
2. Chapter III – Poland-On the Periphery of Near 
Abroad 
This chapter will be a main case study of this thesis. 
This is not only because of the nationality of author, but 
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mainly because the last several years of relationship 
between Russia and Poland tell almost the whole story of how 
Russia is pursuing its foreign policy. Poland has posed for 
Russian diplomacy one of the toughest challenges for the 
last 18 years within the post-communist timeframe. So, 
examination of the Russian foreign policy mechanics used 
against Poland will enable a deep insight into the Russian 
strategy and intentions. 
3. Chapter IV - Ukraine-Close Near Abroad 
The fourth chapter will consist of examination of the 
Russian relationships with Ukraine. Ukraine is a good 
example to highlight different aspects of the Russian DIME, 
especially with comparison to Poland. As far as Ukraine is 
concerned, it seems that the (E)conomy and (I)nformation 
components of the Russian DIME are dominant. But, the fact 
that different components of DIME are more relevant for 
Ukraine than for Poland or Georgia is not the only reason 
that Ukraine has been chosen. What contributed to the fact 
that Ukraine is so interested in terms of its relationships 
with Russia is that Ukraine experienced dramatic political 
change known as the Orange Revolution. Examination of the 
Russian DIME towards Ukraine after the Orange Revolution 
reveals some interesting patterns in the Russian foreign 
policy strategy. 
4. Chapter V - Georgia-Too Close Near Abroad 
The fifth chapter is also the last case study. In this 
chapter, the relationships between Russia and Georgia will 
be examined. Despite its small size, the location of Georgia 
in a strategic place, the Transcaucasus, highly elevates the 
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significance of this country. The Transcaucasus, is a 
Russian “soft underbelly” because it is a complex mosaic of 
ethnic, economic, and political interests, that has always 
contributed to instability in this region. The last military 
confrontation between Russia and Georgia fits the violent 
tradition of Caucasus very well; however, it seems that the 
last eruption of violence in Georgia has its roots outside 
the region. 
 10
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CONTEMPORARY 
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY FOUNDATIONS 
A. BALANCE OF POWER THEORY 
1. Introduction 
From the standpoint of political sciences, the last two 
centuries of the world’s history can be described as a 
period of emergence, development, and dominance of the 
nation-state form of political organization. Within the 19th 
century − specifically after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
− the first burst of the creation of new nation−states took 
place in Europe.5 As Philip G. Roeder argues “the source of 
new nation−states has been a crisis of ‘stateness’ − a 
crisis in which residents contest the human and geographic 
borders of existing states and some residents even seek to 
create new independent states…”6 But, the question arises, 
what are the reasons for such a crisis of “stateness,” and 
what triggers people to challenge existing states in order 
to build a new ones? Bruce D. Porter argues that, “…great 
wave of state formation occurred in the wake of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which unleashed powerful 
forces of nationalism all across Europe. Originating in war 
and propagated by invading armies, this nationalism 
transformed dynastic states into true nation−states….”7 So, 
                     
5 Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation−States Come From: Institutional 
Change in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 6. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Bruce D. Porter, War and The Rise of the State: The Military 
Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 106. 
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according to Porter, the transformation from dynastic states 
to the nation−states has its roots in war, and nationalism 
played a main role in nation−state building. So, it can be 
argued that the nation-state had emerged as a most effective 
form of political organization in terms of capability to 
wage war and protect the national interests. As it was 
stated above, the 19th century had witnessed the birth and 
development of nation-states, which shaped the world’s 
political order for the next 100 years. These political 
processes can be called the first main wave of the nation-
state creation. The second major wave took place after WWI, 
when the emergence of nation−states in Europe was boosted by 
the collapse of Austro−Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman 
Empire. The nation−state model became the dominant form of 
societal organization. The nation−state’s most 
characteristic features were the following. 
• fixed borders with not−transferable territory 
• promotion of economic unity 
• centralized and uniform public administration; 
• promotion of unified national culture, language, 
and values 
• recognition by other nation−states8 
The last big wave of nation-state creation took place in the 
20th century, resulting in emergence of dozens of states, 
especially in Africa (during the post-imperial period of the 
1950s and 1960s), and in Eastern Europe after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. At least in terms of 
numbers, it can be said that these political processes have 
                     
8 Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation−States Come From: Institutional 
Change in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007). 
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decisively confirmed the dominance of the nation-state model 
as a basic form of political organization at the 
international level. 
2. Balance of Power Theory-Main Propositions 
In the world dominated by nation-states the 
relationships among these entities are shaped by complex 
mosaic of factors, forces and interests. The realist 
proponents argue that all the state’s political incentives 
and motivations can be reduced to several basic 
propositions, which constitute the pillars of the balance of 
power theory. According to T. V. Paul: 
Balance of power theory is predicated on the 
notion that states seek to survive as independent 
entities. They also seek power in the anarchical 
global system; without power, states can become 
subservient to the will of others or lose their 
security and prosperity. Anarchy thus compels 
states to increase their power, because security 
and physical survival cannot be divorced from 
power maximization. As a result, the competition 
for power becomes a natural state of affairs in 
international politics.9 
Similarly, Hans Morgenthau noted that: 
The aspiration of power on the part of several 
nations, each trying either to maintain or 
overthrow the status quo, leads necessarily to a 
configuration that is called the balance of power 
and to policies that aim at preserving it….The 




                     
9 T. V. Paul, Balance of Power, Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 4. 
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preservation are not only inevitable but are an 
essential stabilizing factor in a society of 
sovereign nations.10 
Thus, it can be argued that power serves as a medium which 
establishes, preserves, and shapes the relationships between 
states. According to the proponents of the balance of power 
theory, the international political system can be maintained 
in balance once the parity in power exists among states. In 
other words, there is a kind of equilibrium achieved, which 
prevents violating the current status quo. This status quo 
or equilibrium is nothing more but a state of peace between 
states. But, what encourages states to engage in power 
balancing? One of the most convincing explanations is given 
by Kenneth N. Waltz: 
From the theory, one predicts that states will 
engage in balancing behavior whether or not 
balanced power is the end of their acts. From the 
theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward 
balance in the system. The expectation is not 
that a balance once achieved will be maintained, 
but that a balance disrupted will be restored in 
one way or another. Balances of power recurrently 
form.11 
Another explanation is given by Inis L. Claude who noted 
that “war is begun with expectation of winning,”12 so if the 
political system is balanced in terms of power, the 
plausibility of war is low. 
                     
10 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, RM−6278−ARPA (New York: 
Knopf, 1973), 161, quoted in Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and 
Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power. Stability in International 
Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 75. 
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: 
Random House, 1979), 127, quoted in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and 
Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 6. 
12 Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: 
Random House, 1962), 56. 
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Thus, taking into consideration what was written above, 
the underlying axioms of the balance of power theory can be 
recapitulated as follows. 
• States are the main actors on the international 
political scene 
• The international political system is anarchical, 
so there is no hegemon above states 
• States act rationally to maximize their security, 
power and resources 
• In the world of competing states, balance of power 
is a final political configuration13 
The relatively basic and simple axioms of the balance 
of power theory constitute nothing but only the frame which 
can be of use to describe the states’ behavior. However, 
this frame needs to be supplemented by more detailed 
considerations with reference to some implications of the 
balance of power theory, especially as far as “small 
states”14 are concerned. 
                     
13 Jack S. Levy, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Writz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 34. 
14 There is no agreement between scholars on the definition of “small 
state.” The main difficulty is that whether certain country is a “small 
state” or not can only be defined by comparing it to other states, not 
by the measuring of any objective elements of the state’s capabilities. 
However, there are some definitions of “small states” which can be of 
use in order to understand this notion with reference to the balance of 
power theory. One of the definitions is given by Robert L. Rothstein who 
noted that, “A small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot 
obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it 
must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, 
processes, or developments to do so; the small power’s belief in its 
inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by other 
states involved in international politics.” See, Robert L. Rothstein, 
Alliance and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University, 1968), 29. 
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3. Balance of Power Theory-Small States’ Perspective 
and Strategies 
a. Building Coalitions and Building up Arms 
If one will examine the propositions of the 
balance of power theory, and compare them to the political 
reality, it will be easy to notice that seeking power is 
somewhat contradictory to the notion of keeping a balance of 
power. Assuming that states act rationally, seeking power 
should be a natural incentive for them, because more power 
means more safety that in turn improves the prospects for 
survival of the state as an independent entity. On the other 
hand, more power on the side of one state undermines the 
balance of power of the whole system. So, in order to keep 
the political system in the equilibrium, other states are 
forced to seek power as well. This in turn implies that even 
if the political system is in the balanced state, the 
equilibrium is somewhat unstable. This conclusion was much 
better rephrased by Hans J. Morgenthau who wrote “all 
nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must 
actually aim not at a balance-that is, equality-of power, 
but at superiority of power.”15 So, to continue the 
reasoning, even if there is a state of balance, it is very 
likely that some states can gain a preponderance which 
inevitably threatens the other (often smaller and weaker) 
state actors. One of the possible strategies for the weaker 
states which often are unable to secure themselves is to 
                     
15 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, RM−6278−ARPA (New York: 
Knopf, 1973), 208. 
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form a coalition (external balancing)16 of weak states to 
balance the rising power. The other possible strategy is to 
build up arms (internal balancing)17 in order to increase 
its own deterrence capabilities.18 So, it can be said that 
small states can either form coalitions or build up arms to 
balance the global or regional powers (Strategy I and II). 
b. Bandwagoning 
Both, external and internal balancing are not the 
only strategies available for small states for their foreign 
policy. The historical records show that in certain 
situations, small states are seeking protection by alignment 
with great power,19 rather than making coalitions with other 
small states. This strategy is called bandwagoning. 
According to Stephen M. Walt, bandwagoning is a strategy 
based on alliance (often forced by great power) with a great 
or dominant power in order to appease it or for the future 
profits from its dominance. Bandwagoning is always 
asymmetrical; it means that the dominant power profits much 
more from the alliance than the small state. Moreover, there 
is a high risk involved for a small state because it must 
fully rely on the great power’s good will20 (Strategy III). 
                     
16 Mark R. Brawley, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 81. 
17 Ibid., 81-82. 
18 T. V. Paul, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 5-6. 
19 These can be cases of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland who 
bandwagoned to Nazi Germany before and during WWII. 
20 Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case 




Similarly, there is another configuration 
possible. It occurs when a small state along with a great 
power develop mutually equal relations which are aimed at 
reducing the tension in international politics or in 
balancing the threat posed by the third actor. This strategy 
is called détente. As opposite to bandwagoning, détente is 
characterized by roughly equal exchange of costs and profits 
between aligned states. It also involves relatively low risk 
for a small state because if the great power will attempt to 
take advantage of its power, the small state can simply 
break off détente21 (Strategy IV). 
d. Buck-passing 
Although the four strategies listed above are the 
most common ones in international politics, there are also 
at least two other options available for small states. The 
first one is called buck-passing (Strategy V). Buck-passing 
is simply declining membership in the alliance “out of the 
belief that this coalition already has aggregated enough 
power to deter or defeat the dominant power, or is likely to 
act even without its participation.”22 It is a highly risky 
strategy for numerous reasons (e.g., exposing the state to 
the threat of dominant power, undermining the existing  
 
 
                     
21 Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case 
of Southwest Asia,” International Organization 42, no. 2: (1988) 275-
316. 
22 Mark R. Brawley, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 83. 
 19
balancing alliance, weakening the state’s credibility 
etc.).23 The only reason for buck-passing can be explained 
on the basis of economy. As Mark R. Brawley noted: 
Since converting economic wealth into power is 
costly, avoiding those costs through buck-passing 
may be sensible if the state believes it is not 
under immediate threat, or if it requires time to 
invest in its own economy to develop the capacity 
to produce military forces. Joining a balancing 
alliance means nothing unless the state also 
contributes credible forces to that alliance.24 
e. Neutrality 
The second of the earlier mentioned options to 
choose for small states is neutrality (Strategy VI). This 
option is available for few states. As Allen Sens noted: 
Neutrality requires the tolerance, agreement, or 
approval of the great powers-at least those in 
the immediate vicinity-to underwrite or guarantee 
the neutrality of the small state, as in the case 
of Belgium and the Treaty of London. Several 
neutrality policies adopted in the interwar 
period were rendered superfluous when Nazi 
Germany simply chose not to honor them. 
                     
23 A good historical example of buck-passing strategy is given by 
John J. Mearsheimer. He notes that “During the early years of World War 
I, for example, British policymakers tried to minimize the amount of 
fighting their troops did on the western front and instead get their 
alliance partners, France and Russia, to assume the costly burden of 
wearing down the German army. The United Kingdom hoped then to use its 
still-fresh troops to win the final battles against Germany, and to 
dictate the terms of peace. The United Kingdom would “win the peace,” 
because it would emerge from the war in a substantially more powerful 
position than either the defeated Germans or the battle-worn French and 
Russians. The United Kingdom’s allies quickly figured out what was going 
on, however, and forced the British army to participate fully in the 
awful task of bleeding the German army white.” See, John J. Mearsheimer, 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton&Company, 2001), 159-
160. 
24 Mark R. Brawley, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 83. 
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Neutrality arrangements are usually founded on 
the mutual self-interest principle, and if this 
mutual self-interest on the part of the great 
power breaks down, so too the viability of the 
neutrality policy.25 
The total dependence on the good will of the great powers 
who guarantee the neutrality poses the biggest disadvantage 
of the neutrality strategy. Neutrality is also hard to 
achieve for countries which are geographically close to the 
great powers and even harder for these states which lie 
between great powers.26 Such states are inevitably subject 
to the influence of the mighty neighbors. This is the reason 
why in the contemporary globalized world, where the great 
powers’ interest expand almost everywhere, there are so few 
states which enjoy neutrality. So, the neutrality strategy 
is rather a theoretical option, than a real possibility for 
overwhelming majority of small states. 
4. Summary 
To sum up, the balance of power theorists agree that 
the principles of this theory allow states to pursue 
different policies and to choose different strategies for 
their foreign policy. There are at least six strategies 
available for state actors (making coalitions, building up 
arms, bandwagoning, détente, buck-passing, and neutrality). 
                     
25 Sens Allen, The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe: 
A New Research Agenda? Working Paper no. 1 (Vancouver: The Institute of 
International Relations, 1994). 
26 One of the best examples for that is Poland. In the 18th century 
Poland was three times partitioned among its neighbors (Prussia, Russia, 
and Austro-Hungarian Empire). In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
partitioned Poland once again. See, Norman Davies, God's Playground: A 
History of Poland in Two Volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
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Although in this passage all these six strategies were 
analyzed from the small states’ perspective, some of them 
are universal and can be of use also for great powers. This 
refers particularly to the internal balancing (building up 
arms), building coalitions or to the buck-passing strategy. 
B. BALANCE OF POWER THEORY IN PRACTICE-COLD WAR ERA AND 
POST COLD WAR CONSEQUENCES 
1. Introduction 
Although the balance of power is a concept which was 
known as far back as ancient history, the development of the 
technical civilization in the last two centuries, and new 
world political divisions have led to the previously 
uncommon phenomenon: competition of the interests of great 
powers. In the pre-modern times, the great powers used to 
grow in a geographical separation from each other (e.g., 
Roman Empire and Chinese Empire), and the growth of one 
great power did not interfere with the emergence of another. 
There were some cases of the great powers’ clashes, like 
the conflict between the Arab Empire and Byzantine Empire 
in the 8th century;27 however, only the modern era made the 
conflicts of interests an inseparable feature of the 
international politics. In the 19th century, England and 
Russia crushed the power of Napoleonic France. During WWII, 
Great Britain, the USA and USSR did the same to the Nazi 
Germany and then Japan. The collapse of one great power was 
caused by either overcoming it by a stronger opponent or 
coalition of opponents. The opposite side of these 
                     
27 Hugh Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs (New York: Routledge, 
2001). 
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processes was that the winning powers became even more 
powerful, which in turn led to the emergence of the bipolar 
world political order. 
From the smoke of WWII battlefields, a new political 
order had emerged. On the world’s stage, two superpowers28 
(USA and Soviet Union) took their positions in the opposite 
corners, starting an open confrontation, which has been 
known as the Cold War.29 The Cold War was an interesting 
example of how the balance of power theory principles work 
in practice. This is one of the reasons for the examination 
of the Cold War in this work. The second, but even more 
important reason for including the Cold War considerations 
into this work is the fact that the outcome of this 
confrontation directly and strongly influences the 
contemporary Russian foreign policy. 
2. Cold War Era 
Among scholars there is no consensus what 
differentiates a great power from a superpower; however, one 
of the most popular explanation is given by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who lists four necessary conditions for a great 
power to become a superpower. These are the following. 
 
                     
28 The term “Superpower” was used for the first time in its 
contemporary meaning by William T. R. Fox-an American foreign policy 
professor in 1944. See William T. R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United 
States, Britain and the Soviet Union–Their Responsibility for Peace (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). 
29 John L. Gaddis attributes the first use of the term of “Cold War” 
to President Truman’s advisor, Bernard Baruch, who so named the tension 
between USA and Soviet Union in 1947. See, John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold 
War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 54. 
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a. Military strength and capabilities to wage war in 
any place in the world 
b. Economic strength and capabilities to satisfy the 
military needs; 
c. Technological power and innovations, especially in 
the areas of use for the military; 
d. Cultural strength and influential ideology. This 
refers to the ability to propagate the cultural 
models, behavior and lifestyle efficiently.30 
There is little doubt that the USA and the Soviet Union 
were the only states after WWII which gained the 
characteristics of the superpower. It became especially 
apparent in the military area (Point a above). Both 
countries were the only states having a nuclear weapon in 
their arsenals, at least in the early stages of Cold War.31 
As far as economical and technological development (Points b 
and c above) are concerned, the first decade of the Cold War 
witnessed an impressive advance, especially in the Soviet 
Union. As Rodric Braithwaite noted: 
The Soviets rebuilt their country after a 
fashion, but with amazing speed. Soviet military 
science and industry forged ahead. Soviet 
scientists and engineers mastered thermonuclear 
fusion built formidable bombs and rockets and 
catapulted a dog, and then a man, into space. The 
Soviet leaders and the Soviet people felt-for the 
first time in their history-that they were 
beating the West at its own game of technical 
excellence.32 
                     
30 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and 
its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1998). 
31 Although France, Great Britain, and other countries became the 
nuclear powers the passage of time, their total nuclear capabilities 
were still significantly low in comparison to the arsenals of both 
superpowers. 
32 Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned 
Upside Down (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 39. 
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Moreover, the Soviet Union was a motherland of “universalist 
and Messianic”33 ideology of communism (Point d above). The 
communist ideology was spreading quickly, fueled by the 
rising power of the Soviet Union. The communist advances in 
Asia (North Korea, Vietnam), Latin America (Cuba, to some 
extent Chile before Pinochet seized power), and Africa 
(Angola), as well as the emergence of massive communist 
parties in the Western Europe (France or Italy) challenged 
the American position and interests, and threatened the 
Western political system. This constituted a fertile ground 
for the upcoming confrontation between both superpowers. 
From the perspective of the balance of power theory the 
strong polarization of the international political stage 
after WWII was an ideal opportunity to see how the 
principles of the theory work in practice. So, from the 
theoretical standpoint, the Cold War can be regarded as an 
example of hard balancing. As T. V. Paul noted: 
Hard balancing is a strategy often exhibited by 
states engaged in an intense interstate rivalry. 
States thus adopt strategies to build and update 
their military capabilities, as well as create 
and maintain formal alliances and 
counteralliances, to match the capabilities of 
their key opponents.34 
There is little doubt that the Cold War was an open 
confrontation, where both superpowers made intense efforts 
to make alliances as broad as possible and build up their 
military capabilities (Strategy I and II). These processes 
                     
33 Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned 
Upside Down (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 38. 
34 T. V. Paul, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 3. 
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resulted in emergence of two formal military blocs; North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the Warsaw 
Pact in 1955.35 Emergence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact left 
no doubt that the military capabilities would play a 
decisive role in this rivalry. Interestingly, even at such 
early stages of Cold War, there were some signs forecasting 
the final outcome of this struggle. Rodric Braithwaite noted 
that “unlike their American opponents, the Soviets had no 
allies, only satellites who showed from time to time a 
distressing tendency to rebel.”36 After WWII “it was 
inevitable that the Soviet Union would dominate Eastern and 
Central Europe. There was nothing that the West could do 
about it, unless it went to war or unless the Soviet Union 
changed profoundly. The West was unwilling to do the first. 
The second was beyond its control.”37 It is a very 
significant observation. The Soviets simply conquered 
Eastern Europe by installing communist regimes in the 
formerly independent countries beyond any democratic 
procedures and rules.38 Although the conquered states were 
still formally independent, the communist regimes were 
directly subordinated to Moscow. 
The Russian illegitimate political dominance over 
Eastern Europe combined with the inherent economical 
inefficiency of the communist system, produced a lot of 
                     
35 John Gearson and Kori Schake, ed. The Berlin Wall Crisis: 
Perspectives on Cold War Alliances, Cold War History Series (London and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
36 Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned 
Upside Down (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 41. 
37 Ibid., 37. 
38 Richard F. Staar, “Elections in Communist Poland,” Midwest Journal 
of Political Science 2, no. 2, (1958): 200-218. 
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internal grievances within the Soviet’s communist 
satellites. The massive workers’ protests in Poland (1956 
and 1980), revolution in Hungary (1956), or in 
Czechoslovakia (1968), were clear examples that the 
communist block was internally corrupted. The only glue 
holding it together was a brutal military force of the Red 
Army.39,40 The Russians were able to suppress both of these 
revolutions; however, the need for the use force itself 
proved that the communist camp was more a forced alliance 
than the coalition of willing states. So, political 
legitimacy constituted the first Soviet problem. The second 
one was inherent in the communism system. It was the 
economic inefficiency. As Rodric Braithwaite noted: 
… the Soviet Union was already in deep domestic 
crisis. Its political and economic system was 
muscle-bound and sclerotic. Agriculture was a 
mess. Capital construction was grossly wasteful. 
The consumer was ignored, and social services 
were underfunded. Above all, despite its 
successes in space and defense, Soviet technology 
was lagging increasingly behind the West.41 
Being aware of these problems and particularly of the 
economical disadvantage of the Soviets, the USA authorities 
adopted an internal balancing strategy aimed at building up 
arms and strengthening the US economical capabilities. This 
strategy was intensified by Reagan administration. This 
acceleration was prompted by the perception “that the United 
                     
39 Andreas Gemes, “International Relations and the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution: A Cold War Case Study,” 
http://www.cliohres.net/books/1/13_Gemes.pdf (accessed August 14, 2008). 
40 Gordon H. Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution 
(Princeton, 1976). 
41 Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned 
Upside Down (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 39. 
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States had the economic strength needed to compete 
effectively with a faltering Soviet economy.”42 A special 
role in this strategy was assigned to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI). This program started in 1983, and was 
aimed at ensuring the USA safety from the ballistic 
missiles. Although SDI had a defensive character, it forced 
Russians to respond because an efficient anti-ballistic 
defense would upset the nuclear balance of power also known 
as a doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).43,44 
Although there is no hard evidence, the SDI program seemed 
to severely weaken the Soviet power. The Soviet Union was 
not capable any longer to keep pace with the USA. As a 
consequence, in 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev announced a program 
of reforms known as perestroika and glasnost.45 Although, 
these programs were originally aimed at reforming the 
communist system, they unintentionally started a chain 
reaction, which led to the end of communism and the Cold 
War. 
C. POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Russian Political Culture and Search for a New 
Identity 
On December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union was formally 
dissolved by the Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian 
                     
42 Mark R. Brawley, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 91. 
43 Daniel O. Graham, Confessions of a Cold Warrior (Fairfax: Preview 
Pr., 1995). 
44 William J. Broad, Teller's War: The Top-Secret Story behind the 
Star Wars Deception (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
 28
presidents during the meeting in Belavezha. Two weeks later, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was 
established.46 These events decisively changed the 
geopolitical surrounding of Russia, thus the “Russian 
leaders and the Russian public were faced with an almost 
paralyzing degree of confusion about which [course of 
action] would best protect Russian interests.”47 As Nicole 
J. Jackson analyzed: 
Russia faced a new geopolitical situation. It had 
inherited 80 per cent of the former Soviet 
territory and 60 per cent of the Soviet 
population. Its economy and resources were 
comparatively limited, as was its military power. 
The Russian political elite and public faced 
great anxieties due to many internal problems, 
including a severe economic crisis and the rise 
of crime. … Moreover, Russia had lost its former 
position as a superpower on the international 
stage. The threat of the Cold War was gone, but 
the perception of insecurity was great.48 
Therefore, there was no surprise that within Russian 
political circles, a debate started on how to formulate the 
foreign policy agenda in order to strengthen the 
international position of Russia. This debate, however, was 
strongly influenced by a unique set of perceptions, 
attitudes and inclinations deeply embedded in the Russian 
mentality. This collective consciousness can be best called 
the Russian strategic or more broadly the Russian political 
                     
45 Prem Shankar Jha, Perilous Road to Market: The Political Economy 
of Reform in Russia, India, and China (Michigan: Pluto Press, 2003). 
46 Chartya’97-Novosti of Belarus website, “14 Years of Belavezha 
Accords’ Signing,” http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2005/12/08/14 
(accessed August 21, 2008). 
47 Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, 
Debates and Actions (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 2. 
48 Ibid., 2. 
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culture. Fritz W. Ermarth defined the strategic culture as 
“a body of broadly shared, powerfully influential and 
especially enduring attitudes, perceptions, dispositions, 
and reflexes about national security in its broadest sense, 
both internal and external, that shape behavior and 
policy.”49 In the Russian case, the strategic culture was 
shaped by a non-democratic, absolutist and imperial 
heritage. This heritage’s roots can be traced to Tsar Ivan 
III’s reign. Ivan III consolidated the political power and 
built statecraft’s model based on “Absolutism and militarism 
under cautious and scrupulous control.”50 This model turned 
out to be a very effective in building the power of Russia, 
thus was exploited with minor modifications to the end of 
the Soviet Union.51 
As it was stated above, the Russian political elites 
found themselves in urgent need to create foreign policy 
principles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, 
“Since foreign policy is inherently linked to perceptions of 
national identity, one of the basic challenges they 
encountered was to create a new national identity for their 
country.”52 There were two main notions around which the 
identity could be established, namely language and the 
state’s borders.53 
                     
49 Fritz W. Ermarth, “Russian Strategic Culture: Past, Present, 
and…in Transition?” in Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (October 16, 2006): 3. 
50 Hugh Ragsdale, The Russian Tragedy: The Burden of History (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1996), 18. 
51 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1995), 85-129. 
52 Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories 
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53 Ibid., 29. 
 30
With regard to the language criterion, there were five 
main attitudes how to define who was or should be deemed 
Russian. So, 
• The Russians are all people who speak Russian 
language in the former Soviet states; 
• The Russians are all people with ethnic Russian 
origins; 
• The Russians are people of Slavic origins living 
in the Former Soviet Union (FSU); 
• The Russians are “imperial people” having a 
mission to create a supranational state; 
• The Russians are all people in Russia regardless 
of their origin or culture-the notion of civic 
state.54 
As far as the Russia’s borders were concerned Nicole J. 
Jackson noted that: 
those who argued that Russia should be a civic 
state were in agreement that the 1991 borders of 
the Russian Federation should be kept intact. In 
contrast, those who defined Russia in terms of 
language interpreted Russia as including the 
Russian Federation and also those areas of the 
Soviet Union inhabited by Russian-speakers. 
Similarly, those who rejected the linguistic 
definition but believed that Russia had a wider 
‘Union’ identity also did not accept the 1991 
borders.55 
Besides language and state’s borders which were the two 
main determinants of the national identity, the debate over 
Russia’s future was also focused on several other issues 
(e.g., defining the Russian mission, psychological and  
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Debates and Actions (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 28. 
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geographical identity, political and economic direction). As 
a result of this debate, three basic foreign policy 
orientations emerged. 
2. Competing Foreign Policy Orientations in Russia 
a. Liberal Westernist Orientation 
The first orientation which emerged from the 
national debate over the future Russian foreign policy goals 
was a liberal westernist one. This orientation’s underlying 
concept was “that Russia’s identity should be defined as a 
civic state in the boundaries of the Russian Federation.”56 
The proponents of this orientation rejected any ideas that 
Russia should identify itself based on the Russian 
uniqueness or messianic mission. Instead, they called for 
building Russia as “a ‘normal state’, with no overarching 
mission, whose future was to be a modern, liberal state 
coexisting in a benign international environment.”57 
Furthermore, this orientation called for a peaceful, non-
antagonistic world, with Russia’s focus on cooperation with 
the West and a non-interfering policy towards the near 
abroad. The liberal westernist called also for 
democratization and market reforms as the basis on which the 
civic state should be built. 
                     
56 Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories 
Debates and Actions (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 34. 
57 A. Kozyrev, “Vneshnyaya Politika Rossi,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 
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b. Fundamentalist Nationalist Orientation 
The fundamentalist nationalist orientation emerged 
as the total opposition to the liberal westernist one. The 
fundamentalist nationalists “believed in an ethnic or Slavic 
definition of Russia. Russia’s borders were thus seen either 
to extend beyond the Russian Federation or to be narrowly 
confined to the areas populated by ethnic Russians in 
Russia.”58 The nationalists perceived the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as a disaster and blamed the West for that. 
They propagated the idea of the Russian’s historical mission 
“to create an ‘organic society’,”59 which could only be 
accomplished by gaining Russia power and prestige once 
again. In the nationalists’ eyes, Russia was surrounded by 
hostile countries taking advantage of its temporary 
weakness. Thus, the path to restore the power and prestige 
to Russia was to concentrate domestic political power 
according to the notion of a “strong hand” rules. This in 
turn demanded rejection of democratic and free market 
principles which were perceived as undermining the strength 
and unity of the state’s leadership. As a result, the 
nationalists called for isolationist foreign policy with 
regards to the world economic system, and at the same time 
they called for active policy with regards to the near 
abroad in order to restore the power of great Russia.60 
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c. Pragmatic Nationalist Orientation 
The mid foreign policy orientation between the 
liberal westernist and fundamentalist nationalist was the 
pragmatic nationalist one. For the proponents of this 
orientation, “Russian identity was generally defined 
linguistically and thus they strongly championed the defense 
of Russian-speakers in the near abroad.”61 The main 
difference between the fundamentalist nationalist and 
pragmatic nationalist was that the later “accepted the 
liberal westernist goal of liberal democracy and 
marketization, but wanted the process of transition to take 
Russian conditions into account.”62 The pragmatic 
nationalist shared the vision of great Russia with the 
fundamentalists, but saw Russia as a broker between West and 
East having its own mission and interests. The pragmatists 
seemed to accept use of military forces to protect Russia’s 
interests because: 
The pragmatic nationalists generally conceived of 
the world as organized according to the principle 
of ‘Balance of Power’ in which strong states 
protect their spheres of interests and, unlike 
the liberal westernists, they identified specific 
threats to Russia which included the treatment of 
the Russian diaspora and NATO expansion.63 
The different attitudes presented by the three 
Russian foreign policy orientations are depicted in the 
table below. 
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Table 1.  Russian Foreign Policy Orientations.64 
Categories of ideas Liberal westernism Pragmatic nationalism Fundamentalist nationalism 
Identity (who are 
the Russians?) 
Civic: Russians in 
Russia 
Linguistic: Russian 
speakers in FSU 
Union: Ethnic Russians 
or Slavs in FSU, or 
Ethnic: Ethnic 
Russians in Russia or 
FSU 
History No use Important Crucial 
Collapse of USSR Positive Negative Negative/blame West 
Russia’s borders Russian Federation Russia (and parts of FSU) 
Russia and parts of 
FSU/Russian Federation 
Worldview Peaceful, una[n]tagonistic Balance of power 
Hostile, surrounded by 
enemies 
Geography West Eurasia Eurasia 
Self perception “Normal’ power Great power with own interests 
Great power usually 
with empire 
Mission (Russian 








and market reforms 
modeled on West 
Liberal democracy and 































3. Eurasianism-the Russian Path? 
a. The Victory of Pragmatic Nationalists and 
the Rise of the Eurasianism Idea 
The debate between three main foreign policy 
orientations in Russia was relatively quickly concluded in 
favor of the pragmatic nationalists. The liberal westernists 
were marginalized by 1999 for numerous reasons, among which 
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the rising economic power of Russia and NATO expansion were 
the most significant. On one hand, the economic revival gave 
the Russians a sense of restoration of the great power 
potential and growing political power to utilize it on the 
international stage. On the other hand, the eternal Russian 
suspiciousness towards the West found a fertile ground in 
NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. These processes decisively 
undermined the popularity of westernists’ ideas within both 
the Russian society and policymakers’ circles.65 
Similarly, the fundamentalist nationalists lost a 
lot of their influence, mainly because “the weakness of 
Russian nationalist stems from their inability to clearly 
situate Russian frontiers. Eurasianism brings an ideological 
foundation for post-Soviet imperialism.”66 Thus, it can be 
argued that the pragmatic nationalists won the internal 
Russian debate of ideas forcing their concept of Russia 
being a great power situated in the middle between West and 
East, namely in Eurasia. 
The pragmatic nationalist movement was internally 
diverse, so there had been never established any united 
political entity gathering under one banner all of those who 
aligned themselves with the nationalist ideas. Instead of 
that, several political parties and organizations emerged, 
including the most influential Yabloko movement. The Yabloko 
movement can be described as a centrist nationalist party. 
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They “called for a balanced strategy based upon Russia’s 
geostrategic interests and criticized one-sided Western 
ties, arguing that Russia’s foreign policy should be 
conducted in terms of a strong defense of Russia’s national 
interests.”67 The leader of Yabloko Aleksandr Lukin 
“envisaged Russia as a great power, with special interests 
in the near abroad and ties with to both East and West. 
Lukin also argued for the need… to create … a confederal 
system encompassing the former Soviet Republics.”68 
However, with the time passing more radical 
versions of the nationalist ideas started to gain 
significance. Among them was the idea of Eurasianism. The 
concept of Eurasianism was not a new idea, it had been 
revived and re-formulated by Aleksandr Dugin in his book 
entitled Foundations of geopolitics.69 As John B. Dunlop 
noted, “There has probably not been another book published 
in Russia during the post-communist period, which has 
exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and 
statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of 
Aleksandr Dugin’s 1997 neo-fascist treatise, Foundations of 
Geopolitics.”70 Dugin’s work on his book was strongly 
supported by military circles in Russia, which in turn 
helped Dugin to become an influential figure within the 
Russian political circles. Dugin was able to establish 
close ties with Gleb Pavlovskii-one of the main Kremlin 
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ideologists.71 The proof for how popular the concept of 
Eurasianism became within the political circles in Russia 
can be found in a public statement made by a newly elected 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who said in 2000 that 
“Russia has always perceived itself as Eurasian country.”72 
Moreover, “under Vladimir Putin…Dugin had become ‘one of 
the drafters of national security.’”73 In 2001, Dugin 
created an International Eurasian Movement (IEM), which 
instantly gained huge financial support from the Russian 
government.74 The support for Dugin’s organization given by 
official governmental circles was not restricted only to 
the financial issues. Some of the influential political 
figures became IEM members. As it is listed on the IEM 
website, the members of “Higher Council” of IEM among 
others are as follows. 
• Troshev A.P. – vice speaker of Russian Senate 
• Aslahanov A.A-M. – the adviser of President of 
Russian Federation 
• Margelov M.V. – the president of Committee for 
International Affairs of Russian Senate 
• Kalyuzhny V.I. – vice-minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Russia 
• Tadjuddin T.S. – great mufti of Russian Federation 
• Mitropolit .Andrian (Chetvergov) – the chief of 
Russian Orthodox Old Believers Church 
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• Sagalaev E.M. – the President of National 
Association of Media 
• Djumagulov A.D. – ex-prime-minister of Kyrgyzstan 
Republic 
• Chernychev A.S. – Plenipotentiary Ambassador of 
Russian Federation75 
So, there is little doubt, that IEM having such powerful 
supporters and members must be considered an influential 
organization. Thus, what are the main principles of the 
Eurasianism idea? 
b. Eurasianism idea-The Geopolitical Principles 
In his book Foundations of geopolitics-the 
political manifesto of Eurasianism-and then repeated on many 
occasions, Aleksandr Dugin explicitly presented his views on 
the world’s geopolitical order. So, according to the 
official website of IEM, the basic principles of Eurasianism 
are as follows. 
 
• differentialism, the pluralism of value systems 
versus the conventional obligatory domination of 
one ideology (American liberal-democracy first and 
foremost); 
• tradition versus suppression of cultures, dogmas, 
and discoveries of traditional society; 
• rights of nations versus the ‘gold billions’ and 
neocolonial hegemony of the ‘rich North’; 
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• ethnicities as values and subjects of history 
versus the depersonalization of nations, 
imprisoned into artificial social constructions; 
• social fairness and human solidarity versus 
exploitation and humiliation of man by man.76 
These generally formulated principles are nothing more than 
both the diagnosis and proposal for a new world’s political 
order. The contemporary unipolar world dominated by the USA 
should be challenged by a “new Eurasian Empire”77 led by 
Russia. “This ‘new empire’ must mobilize the Eurasian 
continent for a global struggle against ‘Atlanticism,’ which 
through its ideology of ‘mondialism,’ is planning world 
domination.”78 Thus, “Russia is the incarnation of the quest 
for an historical alternative to Atlanticism. Therein lies 
her global mission.”79 So, according to Dugin, “the sole 
viable course, therefore, is for Russians to rebound from 
the debacle of 1989-1991 [the fall of the Soviet Union] by 
recreating a great ‘supra-national empire,’ one in which 
ethnic Russians would occupy ‘a privileged position.’ The 
result of such a rebuilding effort would be ‘a giant 
continental state in the administration of which they 
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[Russians] will play the central role.’”80 In order to 
achieve this goal “In the beginning stage [of the struggle 
against Atlanticism], Russia can offer its potential 
partners in the East and West its resources as compensation 
for exacerbating their relations with the U.S….”81 Then the 
rising Empire should base its balancing strategy against 
Atlanticism on three axes: Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Teheran 
and Moscow-Tokyo in order to create a multi-polar world. 
With regards to the axis Moscow-Berlin, Dugin proposes de 
facto a great alliance between Eurasian-Russian and France-
Germany blocs. The Central European countries would be 
incorporated into either Russian or German spheres of 
influence. “A ‘special status,’ on the other hand, should 
be accorded to both Latvia and Lithuania, which suggests 
that they are to be allocated to the Eurasian-Russian 
sphere. Poland, too, is to be granted such a ‘special 
status.’”82 The graphic representation of the Eurasianism 
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Figure 1.   Map of Unipolar World. 
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Figure 2.   The Russian-Eurasian Vision of Unipolar 
Counterstrategy. 
Thus, it seems obvious that the Eurasianism idea 
refers directly to new world’s balance of power. The 
unipolar world dominated by Atlanticism would be replaced by 
multipolar world with Russia heading one of the 
counterbalancing blocs. The final and desirable future 
according to Eurasianists looks like the world will be 
divided into four main blocks: Pan-Eurasian, Anglo-American, 
Euro-African and Pacific-Far East. The map below shows the 
graphic representation of this division.84 
                     
84 International Eurasian Movement Website, 
http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1886 (accessed 
August 28, 2008). 
 43
 
Figure 3.   Future Multipolar World. 
Although, the Eurasianism idea undoubtedly gained 
some popularity within the political circles in Russia, the 
question arises, to what extent are the Eurasianism concepts 
really shaping the foreign Russian policy, especially with 
regards to the near abroad? Some Russian authors claim that 
at least some parts of Eurasianism idea are being introduced 
by the Russian authorities. Evgenii Ikhlov noted that: 
[O]ur new chief stratum are incapable of ruling 
under such a democracy… [T]hey stand in need of 
an attractive foundation for another, non-
democratic model. Here Eurasianism 
extraordinarily fits the bill. It offers the 
following: an authoritarian-charismatic 
(autocratic) model; selfless and ascetical 
serving of the regime as the highest form of 
valor (the messianic great power syndrome); the  
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agreement of ethnic and religious minorities to 
play a subordinate role; and imperial 
xenophobia…85 
Similarly, Dmitrii Radyshevskii asks the question, 
“What induces the regime to seek a new ideology in 
Eurasianism?”86 Radyshevskii answers: 
Here [in Dugin-style Eurasianism] there are ideas 
which meet the psychological needs of society: 
there is an alternative to the failed love affair 
with the West; there is the [Russian] tradition 
of messianism; and there is the proximity of 
Asia… The regime stands in need of a new 
ideology, but of a traditional one, ‘integral and 
great.’ All of this is happily combined in 
Eurasianism…87 
c. Russian Goals in its Near Abroad 
Janusz Bugajski in his book identifies six main 
principles and goals of the Russian foreign policy with 
regard to its near abroad. These are as follows. 
• “achieve primary influence over the foreign 
orientations and security postures of the nearby 
states….The Russian authorities have pursued 
influence over the smaller and weaker states in 
order to secure political allies on the 
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potential opposition to Russian policy. Moscow 
wants to forestall rival alliance that could 
effectively block Russian goals.”88 
• “Russia has endeavored to gain increasing economic 
benefits and monopolistic position through 
targeted foreign investments and strategic 
infrastructural buyouts in Eastern Europe. This 
can supply Moscow with substantial influence over 
any country’s economic, financial, trade, and 
investment policies…. In specific economic 
sectors, such as energy supplies, Russia seeks to 
establish regional monopolistic position.”89 
• “Moscow aims to convert East Europe’s overwhelming 
dependence on Russian energy supplies and economic 
investments into long-term, constant, and 
predictable intergovernmental influence. Close 
connections between the Kremlin and the largest 
Russian companies, whether through executive 
appointments, through the promotions of overseas 
operations, or through financial, legal, and 
police instruments, demonstrate that foreign 
policy is closely coordinated. Russian enterprises 
have been encouraged to gain political influence 
through involvement with officials, parties, and 
media outlets in targeted East European states.”90 
• “Russia has attempted to limit the scope and pace 
of Western institutional enlargement and 
integration, especially in the security arena in 
the European CIS states. Moscow has obstructed the 
creation of alliance such as the GUUAM initiative 
(comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova) that could block Russian 
inroads and deepen the region’s ties with NATO.”91 
• “Moscow is preparing to use region, especially the 
European CIS, as a springboard for rebuilding a 
larger sphere of influence and global status and 
reversing Moscow’s decline as a major 
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international player. Strategists calculate that 
this can be accomplished with the help of Western 
resources and by establishing a regional ‘great 
power’ status in Eastern Europe and Asia.”92 
• “by intensifying its involvement in the European 
arena, Moscow seeks to undercut or damage 
transatlantic relation or the Europe-America link. 
The objective is to strengthen the Europe-Russia 
or ‘Eurasian’ strategic ‘pole’ vis-à-vis the 
United States and to establish a Russia-EU system 
of international security for the old 
continent.”93 
To conclude, it can be argued that contemporary 
Russian foreign policy poses a mix of the traditional 
balance of power ideas combined with the specific 
Eurasianism concept. The Russian foreign policy towards the 
near abroad explicitly shows that Russia perceives the 
countries located there as its sphere of influence, where 
the influence of other powers is not welcomed. 
D. SUMMARY 
There is no doubt that the USA has emerged from the 
Cold War confrontation as an undisputable winner-the only 
superpower. From the standpoint of the balance of power 
theory “the power preponderance of a single state or of a 
coalition of states is highly undesirable because the 
preponderant actor is likely to engage in aggressive 
behavior.”94 Thus, it can be argued that the post Cold War 
world witnessed an emergence of a hegemon, whose power is 
                     
92 Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism (Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2004), 31. 
93 Ibid., 31-32. 
94 T. V. Paul, Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirt and Michael Fortmann (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 5. 
 47
not balanced. Does it mean that the balance of power theory 
is not longer suitable to describe the political reality in 
contemporary world, or quite the opposite; the theory 
propositions are still applicable for contemporary politics? 
In this work, the argument will be made that the balance of 
power theory is still appropriate. According to the basics 
of this theory, it is inevitable that the power of the 
current hegemon (USA) will be challenged by other state-
actors. The working hypothesis adopted in this work is that 
Russia’s aspiration is to balance the US domination once 
again. It seems that the Russian authorities, in order to 
achieve this goal, have adopted some Eurasianism ideas. The 
Eurasianism concept predicts rebuilding the great power of 
Russia by unifying the Pan-Eurasian zone as a balance 
against Atlanticism. Russia is supposed to be a leader of 
the opposing bloc. This in turn demands an active Russian 
policy, particularly in her backyard; the so called near 
abroad. 
In the following chapters, the examples of Poland, 
Ukraine, and Georgia will be used to examine the mechanisms 
used by Russian authorities to exert influence on these 
countries. 
 48
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III. POLAND-ON THE PERIPHERY OF NEAR ABROAD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The history of Polish-Russian relationships can be 
perceived as a mosaic of mutual mistrust, suspiciousness and 
hostility constituting a fertile ground for permanent 
tension, which often led to military conflicts. From the 
historical perspective, it is very hard to point to any long 
period of time, in which the Polish-Russian relationships 
were anything, other than the preparation for the next 
confrontation. As a famous Russian philosopher, Nikolay 
Bierdaeev wrote in 1918: 
The old quarrel in the Slavic family, a quarrel 
between Poles and Russians, is hardly possible to 
explain it considering only the political causes 
and factors. The roots of this eternal argument 
lie much deeper than it is often recognized . . . 
First of all it is a quarrel of two kindred Slavic 
souls, related to each other from both the 
language and anthropological perspectives, 
simultaneously so different that the mutual 
understanding is almost impossible.95 
It can be argued that Bierdaeev was only partly right. 
He was undoubtedly right once he admitted that the Polish-
Russian eternal quarrel really exists. On the other hand, he 
was totally wrong in looking for its causes in the Polish 
and Russian national characters or even in so called 
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“national souls.” At the level of international 
relationships, there is no room for a policy made on the 
basis of liking or disliking. The international policy is 
almost exclusively a function of national interests. Thus, 
the argument made in this thesis is based on the assumption 
that the Polish-Russian relationships were always (and still 
are) shaped by purely political interests, rather than by 
any metaphysical factors. 
For the sake of making the argument as clear and 
coherent as possible, this chapter will be divided into two 
parts. The first part will consist of the overview of main 
historical events shaping the Polish-Russian relationships, 
especially with regards to the 20th century. This will 
constitute a necessary base to fully understanding the roots 
of the present mutual mistrust, which is apparently present 
in the Polish attitude to its Eastern neighbor. 
In the second part, the analysis of the present 
relationships between Poland and Russia will be made. This 
analysis will constitute the body of this chapter and will 
be constructed around four dimensions of the state power: 
diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). The 
new approach will be adopted towards this analysis by taking 
into consideration the unconventional side of DIME. The 
underlying assumption to be proved is that the present state 
of the Polish-Russian relationships can be perceived as a 
sequence of minor crises, rooted in the neo-imperial Russian 
policy. 
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B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE POLISH-RUSSIAN 
RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Pre 1989 History 
As mentioned earlier, Poland and Russia share the same 
Slavic roots. Their misfortune for centuries has been to be 
the two biggest Slavic nations sharing a long land border. 
History is overloaded with examples showing that in such a 
geopolitical environment, military conflicts were almost 
inevitable with numerous examples in Europe such as France 
and Germany. There was no exception as far as Poland and 
Russia were concerned.96 During the Middle Ages, Poland was 
in a permanent conflict with Russia. Both countries were 
roughly equally powerful at this time, and both tried to 
conquer the other. As a result, the firm feeling of mutual 
hostility and mistrust was rooted deep into both Polish and 
Russian mentalities. Suffice it to say that Russia and 
Poland never became allies in any of the numerous wars 
within the thousand years of history of both countries. 
At the end of the 18th century, Russia and another two 
Polish neighbors, Prussia and Austria, took advantage of a 
Polish internal weakness and divided the Polish territory 
into three parts.97 The act of the division erased Poland 
from the map of Europe for a hundred and twenty three years. 
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In the territories which were occupied by Russia, the 
Russians pursued the policy of Russification.98 This policy 
was aimed at the elimination from public life of all the 
Polish national symbols, eradication of the Polish language, 
promotion of the Russian culture etc.99 Russification policy 
was even reinforced after the bloody suppression of the 
Polish uprisings in 1830 and 1863.100 The period of the 
Polish captivity ended only after the three occupying powers 
engaged themselves in a disastrous war known later as World 
War I. 
On November 11, 1918, -the day after World War I was 
over, -Poland regained its independence. This was a direct 
consequence of the defeat of two occupying powers, Germany 
and Austria, and the internal weakening of the Russia, where 
a successful communist revolution started in 1917. On 
November 29, 1918, just two weeks after Poland became 
independent, the Russian communist leaders decided to attack 
Poland in order to bring the flame of the communist 
revolution to Germany and then to the whole of Europe. Lenin 
in his order to the Red Army wrote, “Over the dead body of 
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Poland to the heart of Europe.”101 This was the first time 
when the communist Russian authorities decided to use 
military force outside their country to spread communist 
ideology. The Red Army in her march on the West attacked the 
Polish troops in March 1919, which started a Polish-Russian 
war. The decisive battle of this war took place on August 
15, 1920. The Red Army was defeated by Polish troops in a 
battle called later the “Miracle on the Vistula River.”102 
As a result, the Russian communist leaders had to reject 
their plans to bring revolution to the Western Europe. This 
battle was later recognized by some historians as one of the 
most important battles in the European history.103 By this 
victory Poland assured itself another roughly twenty years 
of independent existence. 
On September 17, 1939, just two weeks after the German 
strike against Poland, the Russian troops crossed the Polish 
eastern border, fulfilling by this act the secret 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.104 It was the beginning of a new, 
fifty-year period of foreign domination for Poland. The 
eastern provinces went under the Soviet occupation, where 
the Soviet secret police launched an unprecedented campaign 
of massive repression against Poles, especially against 
those who were well-educated or were working for a state 
before the war (e.g., scientists, military officers, 
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policemen, clerks, priests, teachers etc.). The barbaric 
Russian behavior culminated in the execution of 22 thousand 
Polish prisoners of war in 1940 in Katyn, Kharkov and 
Miednoje.105 Thus, from a broader historical perspective, 
the Russian and German invasion in 1939 can be perceived as 
a new partition of Poland (the fourth one) by the same 
actors as in the 18th century. The only difference was that 
Austria did not participate in this partition itself falling 
victim of Nazi Anschluss a year earlier. 
WWII left Russians on the winning side along with other 
great powers: USA and Great Britain. The decisions made 
during the conferences organized by the winning powers in 
Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam confirmed that Poland was left in 
the Russian zone of influence.106 The Russians got a free 
hand to install fully dependent communist authorities in 
Poland.107 It can be said that Poland ultimately lost its 
sovereignty again after just 20 years of independence. One 
can challenge this opinion by reasoning that Poland was 
formally recognized as an independent state by the 
international community after WWII; however, if one will 
examine the classic attributes of the independent state 
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be easy to come to the conclusion that Peoples Republic of 
Poland did not meet the requirements of an independent 
state.108 
2. Post 1989 Events 
In the late 1980s, rapid-and for many people 
unexpected-political changes took place in the Eastern 
Europe. The foundations of the upcoming revolution were 
built by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Gorbachev, who was fully 
aware of the inefficiency of the communist system, was 
forced to announce a program of reforms known as glasnost 
and perestroika. Although these reforms were at least 
declaratively aimed at strengthening the communist system, 
soon it became obvious that the once launched liberalization 
processes were not reversible. This in turn meant a rapid 
fall of the communist system. The situation and signals 
flowing from Moscow were carefully analyzed by the communist 
authorities in the Eastern Europe’s Russian satellites. It 
can be argued that in Poland the communists first came to 
the conclusion that it was time to share the political power 
with the opposition. In the spring 1989, the Round Table 
Talks started.109 As a result, Poland became the first 
communist country where the communist regime handed over the 
power to the non-communist opposition. 
The events in Poland triggered a chain reaction within 
Eastern Europe, where country after country rejected 
communism and turned towards democracy. Similar processes 
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took place within the Soviet Union which resulted in the 
Soviet Union‘s dissolution in 1991. From the former Soviet 
Empire, several former republics emerged as independent 
states, including Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
created an entirely new political environment which demanded 
from Polish authorities an urgent response to many 
challenging questions: how to secure Polish borders against 
possible military threat; how to establish relationships 
with Poland’s new neighbors and other European countries, 
how to conduct pro-democratic and pro−market reforms without 
creating internal grievances etc. Indisputably the most 
challenging and critical issue in the foreign policy area 
was the problem of how to redefine the Polish-Russian 
relationship, especially since the Red Army troops were 
still present on the Polish territory. There was a fear that 
Russia, after recovering from the shock of the Soviet Union 
collapse, would attempt to reestablish its zone of influence 
over the Eastern Europe. These concerns were fueled not only 
by the historical experiences, but mainly by the numerous 
official statements given by both the Russian military and 
political leaders, more or less directly expressing their 
longing for the lost Empire. After the official dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, both the communist and imperial 
proclivities for the lost Empire culminated in the anti-
Gorbachev coup. This coup did not succeed, but for Polish 
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but perhaps even more importantly within Russian political 
circles, the imperialistic manner of thinking was still 
keen.110 
3. Historical Background-The Key to the Present 
The short overview of the Polish-Russian history gives 
a necessary background, which enables looking at the present 
relationships between both countries from the broader 
historical perspective. In the remote past, one can find 
several examples when Poland attempted to take the advantage 
of the Russian weaknesses to establish Polish control over 
the Russian territory (e.g., the conquest of Moscow in the 
17th century).111 Even for an objective spectator, it is 
easily noticeable that the Polish-Russian history can be 
mainly perceived as a Polish permanent struggle against the 
growing Russian power. During the last three hundred years, 
one obvious piece of evidence has emerged: the Russian 
policy towards Poland has been focused on one main goal, the 
destruction of the Polish statehood and transformation of 
the Poles into the Russians (e.g., the Russification 
policy). This Russian policy can be labeled as imperial one. 
In the past, Russia pursued an imperial policy not only 
towards Poland, but towards many other nations, which were 
conquered and incorporated into the Russian Empire (the 
Baltic nations, the Caucasus nations or the Ukrainians). The 
communist revolution in 1917 did not change the imperial 
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outlook of Russia, quite the opposite; the imperial 
characteristics were even reinforced by the powerful 
communist ideology. The only change was that the imperial 
policy had been covered under the coat of a worldwide 
communist revolution’s slogans. Communist Russia was thus 
elevated to the status of one of the two superpowers after 
WWII. For Poland, such a powerful Russia meant a status of 
being its dependent satellite for more than 40 years. Only 
the collapse of the Soviet Empire opened for Poland a window 
of opportunity to escape from the Russian zone of influence. 
C. POLAND AND THE RUSSIAN DIME 
1. Russian Diplomatic Capabilities in Poland 
a. Political Background 
Diplomacy has always been a main means to achieve 
the states’ foreign policy objectives. In addition, 
negotiations have always been the main instrument to 
accomplish this goal.112 
Having in mind the identified Russian foreign 
policy objectives, it can be argued that Poland is one of 
the main objects of the Russian interest. Poland 
institutionally became a part of the West by joining NATO 
and the EU, however, the geographical proximity to Russia 
made Poland a frontline country between Russia and the West. 
Poland’s act in joining NATO in 1999, decisively 
changed the relationships between Warsaw and Moscow. Poland 
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became a member of the Alliance which was originally 
designated to confront Russia, so the Polish membership in 
NATO was not celebrated in Moscow. The Russians knew that it 
would be no longer possible to use the argument of force in 
relations with Poland. For Poland in turn, the membership in 
NATO warranted the safety guarantees but also was a 
confirmation of Poland’s eternal place in the Western 
cultural hemisphere.113 
In 2000, a newly elected Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, reoriented the Russian strategic priorities. 
The internally oriented policy under President Yeltsin was 
abandoned. Instead of that, a foreign policy oriented 
towards the restoration of the Russian influence, especially 
in the near abroad gained the supremacy. This change 
inevitably contributed to a growing tension between Warsaw 
and Moscow. At that time the main goal of Polish diplomacy 
was to assure for Poland a strong position in the 
international community. This could be achieved by creation 
of Poland as a regional leader, and supporter of democracy 
and free market in the East, especially in Ukraine and in 
the Baltic states. Polish strategists assumed that this 
policy combined with cautious diplomacy and patiently 
elaborated compromises would enable normalization of the 
relationships with Moscow.114 
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b. Classic and Non-Conventional Russian 
Diplomatic Means in Poland 
Russia as a member of numerous international 
organizations-including those most influential (e.g., the 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council)-developed 
powerful, skilful and experienced diplomatic services. The 
challenges of the global diplomacy demand extremely well 
orchestrated and efficient diplomatic apparatus. There is 
little doubt that Russian diplomacy meets all the 
requirements. So, on one hand, the power of the Russian 
diplomacy depends on the position that Russia enjoys in the 
international community. On the other hand, however, the 
power of the Russian diplomacy is a function of the Russian 
foreign policy goals. The identified Russian foreign policy 
goals apparently demand active diplomatic measures. This in 
turn contributes to the growing power of the Russian 
diplomacy in terms of both an access to state’s resources, 
and the position in the state’s hierarchy. 
The Russia’s interests with regards to Poland can 
be described as both local and global. Poland is perceived 
by Russians as a country located on the periphery of the 
near abroad area.115 This perception constitutes the local 
dimension of the Russian policy towards Poland. 
Simultaneously, Poland being a member of the EU and NATO, 
belongs to the West. This enables the Russians to use Poland 
as a convenient proxy to target both these organizations. 
The Russians also use the inverted logic, and try to utilize 
their influence within the EU to force changes in the Polish 
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attitude towards Russia. Thus, it can be argued that Poland 
is at the same time a target and a proxy for the Russians, 
who are simultaneously pursuing their strategic interests at 
both levels. 
Diplomacy is critical for Russia in its relations 
with the West. It seems that the primary Russian foreign 
policy goal is to challenge the position and influence of 
the USA elsewhere, and particularly in Europe. The Russian 
policy aims at exploiting and deepening the divisions 
between the USA and the EU, as well as within the EU 
itself.116 Poland, which strongly supported the US invasion 
of Iraq, started to be perceived in many European capitals 
as the US Trojan Horse in Europe.117 Moreover, the Poles 
irritated the “old EU,” (mainly France and Germany), when 
Poland formed a coalition of smaller states within the EU in 
order to fight for a more advantageous European 
Constitution.118 These two events combined with a fact that 
in 2005 the Parliamentary elections in Poland brought a 
victory to the conservative Law and Justice Party of 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, triggered within the EU a wave of 
criticism against Poland. The Russians spotted a window of 
opportunity to weaken both the unity of the EU, and the 
transatlantic ties between Europe and the USA by targeting  
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Poland. Thus, beginning in 2005, the Russian diplomacy 
undertook active measures to weaken the Polish position in 
the EU and to alienate Poland from the European community. 
These active measures were mainly based on the 
assumption that Poland would protest against any Russian 
attempt to seek any bilateral agreements with the states-
members of the EU “over the Polish heads.”119 Thus, when the 
Russians announced the projects of the South and Nord 
Streams-pipelines bypassing Poland, transporting Russian gas 
and oil directly to the Western Europe, Poland protested 
fiercely.120 These projects were discussed by Russians in 
bilateral talks with Germany and France. From the Polish 
perspective, both pipelines have posed a direct threat to 
the Polish energy security. Russia, having two alternative 
ways to transport its supplies to the Western Europe, will 
be able to easily blackmail Poland with cutting the supplies 
to Poland, not being afraid of the West’s reaction.121 
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Thus, the Russian diplomacy instantly started to 
present Polish fears as a reflection of the Polish Russo-
phobia, isolationism, and disability to cooperate because of 
the historical prejudice. Poland in turn, started to insist 
on the joined EU policy towards Russia. Polish diplomacy 
highlighted the danger that the Russian strategy to talk 
bilaterally to the strongest states within the EU posed to 
the EU unity. The Polish standpoint could be best described 
by a slogan “nothing about us without us.”122 
The crisis in relations between Warsaw and Moscow 
caused by the projected pipelines was even reinforced by 
other mutual insults. The Polish support given for the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine helped prevent the seizure of 
power by the pro-Russian bloc with Victor Yanukovych.123 The 
Russians in turn imposed an embargo on Polish meat. The 
Polish reaction was to bring this issue to the forum of the 
EU by blocking the EU-Russia trade agreement. This strategy 
was extremely risky, and the Polish image of the country, 
which is ready to sacrifice common EU projects for national 
interests, was likely to be created.124 Indeed, the Russians 
tried to exploit the meat crisis exactly along these lines, 
presenting the Polish veto on the European forum as a 
malicious retaliation for the pipeline projects. 
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The chilly Polish-Russian relationships became 
even colder when the issue of possible U.S. anti-missile 
shield installation in Poland surfaced. Although the US 
administration claimed that this project has a defensive 
character, and is aimed at the nuclear threat posed by rogue 
states and terrorists, the Russians’ response was strongly 
negative.125 Officially, the Russians expressed their 
concerns about the shield being allegedly designated against 
Russia, however; within Polish political circles another 
explanation gained popularity. According to the alternative 
version, the Russian objections were motivated by the fact 
that the US installation on the Polish territory will 
ultimately pull Poland out from the Russian zone of 
influence. Indeed, these explanations are more likely to be 
supplementary to each other rather than contradictory, so 
both of them can be valid. 
Only the Parliamentary elections in Poland in 
2007, which brought the victory to the Civic Alliance, 
changed the political atmosphere around the anti-missile 
shield. The new Polish government seemed to be not so 
determined to sign the agreement, seeking rather better 
cooperation within the EU than with the USA. 
Finally, the very last involvement of the Polish 
President Lech Kaczynski in the Georgia-Russia conflict, and 
Kaczynski’s visit to Tbilisi along with the Presidents of 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, forced the EU to 
react more decisively to the Russian military operation. The 
EU reaction in turn probably stopped the Russians’ attempt 
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to topple the Shakashvili government in Georgia.126 The 
Russian diplomacy once again managed to convince the EU 
leaders not to condemn the Russians; however, the unexpected 
consequence of this war was that the Polish government 
quickly finished the negotiations with the USA and signed 
the anti-missile shield agreement. This can be perceived as 
the serious failure of the Russian diplomacy. 
To sum up, it can be said that Poland became one 
of the most important objects for the Russian foreign 
policymakers. Two main Russian interests overlap in Poland: 
(1) local-to minimize Polish significance in the East 
European region, to prevent the Polish influence in Ukraine 
and Baltic states; (2) global-to use Poland, which is the 
most vulnerable target to weaken the EU, and to erode the 
transatlantic ties between Europe and USA. Both of these 
major goals are being accomplished by use of the powerful 
Russian diplomatic capabilities. The conventional dimension 
of these capabilities is reflected in classic diplomatic 
negotiations, articulation of the Russian interests on the 
international forums, building alliances, signing 
agreements, etc. The unconventional dimension refers to the 
state of contradiction between the official declared 
intentions and the real objectives behind them. With regards 
to Poland, there is abundant evidence that Russia in one way 
or another, attempts to diminish the reliability of Poland 
in the eyes of international public opinion and 
policymakers. This is highly consistent with the local 
dimension goal. A weakened, unreliable Poland would be 
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incapable of exerting its influence over Ukraine and serving 
it as an advocate in the EU. This in turn will inevitably 
allow Ukraine slowly to gravitate towards the Russian zone 
of influence. 
2. Russian Informational Capabilities in Poland 
a. Information-A Soft Power 
The contemporary world is often labeled a global 
village. This popular phrase owes its emergence mainly to 
the information revolution that world witnessed during the 
last several decades. As a consequence of this revolution, 
information and ability to control it became a crucial 
element of a state’s power. Joseph Nye argues that the 
understanding of power in world politics has changed. There 
is a new dimension of power which Nye calls “soft power.” In 
its most general meaning “soft power” is an ability to 
influence the decisions of other countries without resorting 
to military force or economic pressure.127 
According to Frank L. Jones, information as an 
element of power includes four basic elements: (1) public 
diplomacy, which includes information activities and 
popularization of culture; (2) public affairs, (3) 
international broadcasting; and (4) international military 
information, which include overt psychological 
operations.128 It seems interesting that in democracies it 
is relatively difficult to develop and conduct long-lasting 
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information campaigns. The reason for that is the 
policymakers’ terms in office are usually too short, and 
competing bureaucratic interests are likely to compromise 
the efforts to build a coherent information strategy.129 
Unlike real democracies, authoritarian states do not have 
problems with conducting cohesive, massive and influential 
information campaigns. It is sufficient to examine the Nazi 
or the Soviet propaganda130 mechanisms in the 20th century to 
confirm this. 
Thus, having in mind that contemporary Russia is a 
“managed democracy”131 the question emerges: Is Russia 
pursuing any coherent informational campaign in Poland, and 
if so, what are the characteristics of the Russian 
informational strategy towards Poland? 
b. Russian Informational Strategy in Poland 
With regards to Poland, the Kremlin is pursuing an 
extremely active informational policy. It can be argued that 
Poland became a target for the Russian information 
operations beginning with the Vladimir Putin’s first term in 
office, and this policy has been not abandoned to date. 
These informational campaigns have been waged with the use 
of both overt (classic) and covert (unconventional) 
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measures, and have been aimed at the Polish, European, and 
Russian societies as well as at the political circles in 
Poland and Europe. 
The reasons for which Poland became a target for 
Russia’s informational operations are fully understandable 
having in mind the Russian foreign policy goals. From the 
Russian perspective, “Poland was promoting an imperial 
agenda of its own in Russia’s near abroad; Warsaw’s 
preoccupation with development in Ukraine was especially 
resented.”132 Moreover, “the Kremlin was perturbed that 
Warsaw was intent on pursuing close ties with Kiev and 
depicted Poland as an aspiring regional power seeking to 
replace Russia. Warsaw was allegedly pursuing the formation 
of a belt of states between the Baltic and Black Sea and 
constructing a cordon sanitaire around Russia.”133 In 
addition to that 
The Poles eagerly adopted the role as ‘Russian 
experts’ in the EU and championed an initiative-
the ‘eastern dimension’-that offered ‘partnership 
relations’ with countries located between the 
expanded EU and Russia. Poland has welcomed the 
prospect of leading the block of states that U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has labeled 
New Europe. From the perspective of the Kremlin, 
the forgoing provides strong evidence that Russia 
is right in seeing Poland as an American Trojan 
Horse in the EU.134 
Thus, for Russian policymakers, it became obvious 
that Poland, being a member of the EU and NATO, is not 
                     
132 Richard J. Krickus, The Iron Troikas: The New Threat from the 
East (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2006), 13-14. 
133 Ibid., 14. 
134 Ibid. 
 69
vulnerable to military pressure, but might be sensitive to a 
well prepared and conducted informational campaign aimed at 
tarnishing the Polish image and undermining Polish appeal 
“to other CIS states; to use [Poland] as a springboard into 
the vast EU market and exploit its membership to shape EU 
policies toward Russia at large; and to gain sufficient 
leverage over it to prevent Washington from using it as an 
agent of influence in Russia’s near abroad.135 
c. Overt (Classic) Informational Means 
The Russian overt (classic) informational means 
towards Poland mainly employ public affairs. The Russian 
authorities use their official representatives, particularly 
diplomats, but also journalists or scientists, to present 
the Russian point of view on certain problems. The most 
characteristic feature of the Russian use of public affairs 
is that the official statements made by Moscow are often 
followed by actions which are contradictory to what was 
previously declared. This mechanism creates an informational 
chaos, and a state of confusion of the targeted audience. In 
the informational chaos, it is extremely difficult for 
people to decide what is going on and who is right. 
Moreover, if the state of chaos lasts for a longer period of 
time, it can exhaust the public opinion relatively quickly. 
This is why in the peoples’ eyes, the party which 
contributes to the solution of the problem is favored 
regardless of the fact, which party created the problem. 
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The example how this strategy was used to weaken 
the position of the Jarosław Kaczyński’s government in the 
Polish public opinion eyes, is the case of the ban put on 
the importation of Polish meat to Russia. In 2005, the 
Russian authorities put the ban on the importation of Polish 
meat, which allegedly did not meet Russian sanitary 
requirements. From the beginning the Russians claimed that 
lifting the ban is only a technical issue and had nothing in 
common with the political tension between Russia and Poland, 
which started to grow after the elections in Poland brought 
the victory to Kaczynski’s party. The negotiations were 
extended by Russians, who were making different conditions 
including the possibility of Russian inspections in Polish 
slaughterhouses. In the meantime, however, the Polish 
government was under growing pressure from the meat 
producers and public opinion to solve the problem. The 
Russians started to accuse Polish authorities of Russo 
phobia, exploiting the commonly known suspiciousness of the 
Polish leadership towards Russia. The official Russian 
statements called for Polish cooperation in solving the 
problem, while in practice Russia was denying any 
cooperation. The Polish government finally asked the EU for 
help, which Russians in turn labeled a politicizing of a 
non-political problem. Finally, after the Parliamentary 
elections in Poland in autumn 2007 swept away the 
Kaczynski’s government, the Russians lifted the ban on 
Polish meat without any additional conditions. This move was 
a clear signal for Polish society that suggested the 
Kaczyński’s government was the main obstacle for quick 
solution to the meat conflict. However, in reality the  
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Russian decision to put a ban on Polish meat seemed to be a 
part of the broader action aimed at weakening the Polish 
pro-Western and particularly pro-American government.136 
The meat conflict gives also a good insight into 
another overt information technique used by Russian. The 
Russians became active in Polish TV and radio stations, 
newspapers and magazines. The Russian experts were invited 
to explain the background of the conflict to the Polish 
society. Although most of them claimed their independence 
from the Russian authorities, the opinions they were 
expressing were highly consistent with the official Russian 
standpoint. Almost all the Russian experts underscored the 
significance of the conflict, labeling the Polish response 
as exaggerated and emotional. The overall trend was to 
present Polish authorities as Russo phobic and xenophobic, 
and to blame the Polish party for spoiling the relationships 
with Moscow. The same mechanism was used to tarnish the 
Polish image on the EU forum, once Poland decided to veto 
the EU-Russia trade agreement.137 
In the Russian informational arsenal, there are 
also less manipulative techniques used to shape Polish 
public opinion in Russia’s favor. These are mainly public 
diplomacy mechanisms. For example, the Russian government 
has been financing the work of the Polish-Russian Friendship 
Association, which is a successor of the communist Polish-
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Soviet Friendship Association. This Association is very 
active in propagating the image of Russia being a normal 
democratic country with a flourishing economy, insisting on 
partnership relations with Poland. The Russians are also 
financing different cultural initiatives like the Russian 
Song Festival, which was resumed in 2008 in Zielona Góra138 
or the film workshops, to list only few.139 The last and 
highly symbolic example of how Russia is attempting to use 
culture for the political purposes is the movie titled “Year 
1612.” This film, which was indirectly financed by the 
Russian government, tells a story about expelling the Poles 
from the Kremlin in 1612. The movie was distributed in 
Russia and Poland. The Poles were presented there in a very 
unfavorable light. What makes this rather mediocre movie 
really interesting, looking from the political perspective, 
is the fact that the Russian authorities under President 
Putin “moved a [Russian] public holiday from November 7, 
which has Communist associations, to November 4 to celebrate 
the date of Russia's triumph over the invading Polish army 
in 1612 and the liberation of Moscow.”140 Thus, it can be 
argued that this film-and especially the intentions behind 
it-is a somewhat symbolic element of the ongoing Russian 
informational campaign toward Poland. 
                     
138 Maja Salwacka, “Wskrzeszony Festiwal Piosenki Rosyjskiej (the 
Russian Song Festival Revived),” Gazeta.pl, 
http://miasta.gazeta.pl/zielonagora/1,51944,4977802.html (accessed 
September 25, 2008). 
139 Russia-Poland New Gaze, http://www.newgaze.info/english (accessed 
September 25, 2008). 
140 Tom Birchenough, “’1612’ Makes Date with Russia,” Variety.com, 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117975238.html?categoryid=13&cs=1 
(accessed September 25, 2008). 
 73
d. Covert (Unconventional) Informational Means 
There is abundant evidence that the Soviet Union 
became an unbeaten master in conducting covert informational 
operations. These operations were based on two main pillars, 
namely propaganda and disinformation, and were often labeled 
the active measures in the Soviet strategy.141 It can also 
be argued that contemporary Russia still uses these powerful 
tools to achieve its political goals. A good example of the 
Russian propaganda operation was conducted at the time of 
NATO expansion towards the Eastern Europe. As Janusz 
Bugajski noted: 
Regular propaganda attacks by Russia’s state 
media outlets are supplemented by more systematic 
disinformation campaign in familiar KGB style 
operations. These have targeted particular 
government, specific politicians, or pro-Western 
political parties in nearby states. These targets 
are depicted as dangerously ‘Russophobic’ and 
thus their inclusion NATO would allegedly poison 
the West’s relations with Russia and introduce 
unstable states into the Alliance. The Russian 
press has frequently cited U.S. and European 
commentators who speak out against NATO 
enlargement on the grounds that it will undermine 
relations with Moscow by making the Alliance more 
anti-Russian.142 
This type of propaganda operation was conducted 
extremely patiently, carefully and with use of a broad 
repertoire of measures. This usually included insertion of 
specific press articles in foreign newspapers, sponsoring 
NGOs or informal groups (anarchists or ecological 
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Publishing Group, 2004). 
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activists), or so called black PR (public relations).143 All 
these efforts were orchestrated with the operational 
activity of the Russian special services (Federal Security 
Service (FSB), Military Intelligence (GRU), and Foreign 
Civilian Intelligence Agency (SWR)). 
FSB as well as GRU and SWR are direct successors 
of their communist ancestors. In communist Poland, the 
Soviet special services enjoyed the superior position. Once 
the Soviet Union collapsed the agents were “frozen,” but 
with the time passing the Russian operatives managed to 
“defrost” these people. The Russian agents were placed in 
the strategic areas of the Polish state, particularly in the 
governmental administration, armed forces, universities or 
media. The spy scandal which broke out in 1999, after three 
Polish counterintelligence officers were accused of spying 
for Russia, revealed the scope of the problem.144 These 
captured spies were classic agents, however, the most 
dangerous and harmful weaponry in the Russian arsenal, are 
so-called “agents of influence.” According to Richard H. 
Schultz and Roy Godson: 
The agent of influence may be a journalist, a 
government official, a labor leader, an academic, 
an opinion leader, an artist, or involved in one 
of a number of other professions. The main 
objective of an influence operation is the use of 
the agent’s position-be it in government,  
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politics, labor, journalism, or some other field-
to support and promote political conditions 
desired by the sponsoring foreign power.145 
The main problem with agents of influence is that 
“the agent of influence may [be] the most complex and 
difficult to document. In fact, even skilled 
counterintelligence officers find it very difficult to 
follow and unravel orchestrated agent-of-influence 
operations.”146 In most cases, there is no material 
evidence, which allows connecting certain persons with the 
foreign power, however, at the time of important events, it 
is relatively easy to notice increased public activity of 
certain people or organizations. Within the last decade, at 
least three events activated certain political circles, 
groups or individuals in Poland. These were Polish accession 
to NATO and EU and the discussion on installing the American 
anti-missile shield in Poland. All these issues concerned 
Russia, and in all these cases Russia found influential 
advocates within the Polish establishment.147 
The examination of both overt and covert measures, 
which were adopted by Russian to wage informational 
operations in Poland, shows that they tend to depend on the 
covert means. There are at least three reasons for that. The 
first one is that the covert means allow more control with 
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more predictable results in a shorter time (agents’ 
operations), while the overt public affairs campaigns demand 
time and the results are uncertain. The second reason is 
that the Russians still have in Poland a huge reservoir of 
trusted and well placed agents, which was inherited from the 
communist times. The third reason is that the overt 
campaigns need to be at least partly positive, attracting 
the targeted audience to the message’s sender. In the Polish 
case, the memory of Russian occupation is still fresh, so 
the Russians do not have too much ammunition to efficiently 
appeal to the Polish society. 
3. Russian Military Capabilities With Regards to 
Poland 
a. Russian Armed Forces 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian armed forces have been in permanent turmoil. The 
allocation of resources caused by a transition from the 
Soviet militarized economy to a semi-free market one, 
contributed to the massive military budget cuts, and 
reduction in troops from 4.3 million in 1986 to 1.2 million 
in 2008.148 The Russian armed forces are still based on the 
conscript, so “readiness and morale remain low, and draft 
evasion and desertion are widespread.”149 Despite these 
problems, the Russian Army still remains “by far a largest 
army in the region.”150 
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Beginning in 1999, the improving economical 
situation in Russia allowed the Russian authorities to 
increase the military budget. In 2007, defense budget was 
about $31.6 billion, and “if one adds the funds allotted in 
2007 for the nuclear, security, and defense-related law-
enforcement activities to the total defense expenditures, 
total budget spending on defense reaches around $58 
billion.”151 According to the report for the Swedish Defense 
Ministry, “the decade-long downsizing of the Armed Forces 
has now definitely come to a halt. Arms procurement is small 
but rapidly increasing while the number and complexity of 
exercises are significantly increasing, albeit from a low 
level. It is likely that Russian military capability will 
increase considerably in a ten-year perspective.”152 Today, 
it seems that the Russians are militarily coming back on the 
international stage. This process is reflected in the fact 
that “some high-profile military activities have been 
resumed, such as large-scale multi-national military 
exercises, show-the flag naval deployments to the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and strategic long-range 
bomber patrols that approach U.S. and NATO airspace.”153 
The Russian status of a world’s major power is 
assured not by the reviving conventional forces, but almost 
solely by the Russian nuclear, and more generally, WMD 
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arsenal. The Russian nuclear arsenal is the second largest 
in the world, and remains almost intact since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Keeping a high readiness of the 
strategic nuclear forces was a timeless priority for the 
Russian authorities. Despite the fact, that in 2000, the 
Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to reduce the 
number of the nuclear warheads from 6000 to 1500.154 This 
reduction did not deprived Russia from a capacity to conduct 
a nuclear strike. And “even if global (nuclear) war is no 
longer the foremost planning factor, Russia’s nuclear triad 
[N, B, C] will remain and increased emphasis will be put on 
tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, Russia will develop both its 
strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals.”155 
b. The Military Dimension of the Polish-Russian 
Relationships 
As it was argued earlier in this chapter, Poland’s 
membership in NATO and the EU diminished the likelihood of a 
direct Russian military action against Poland to the 
theoretical measurement. Nevertheless, it does not mean that 
within the last 16 years the Polish-Russian relationships 
were not influenced by military issues. 
By a year 2000, Poland managed to achieve its two 
main militarily strategic goals, namely to convince Russia 
to withdrew its forces from Poland (1993), and to join NATO 
(1999). Once the ailing Russian President Yeltsin was 
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replaced by Vladimir Putin, the Russian foreign policy 
priorities changed. The new Russian leadership reconciled 
itself with the fact that Poland became a part of the West, 
and secured itself from the direct military Russian action. 
At the same time however, the growing tension between Poland 
and Russia encouraged the Russians to use armed forces, and 
a military rhetoric, to put more or less symbolic pressure 
on Poland. Among the numerous problems in the Polish-Russian 
relationships there are at least two issues, which 
illustrate how Russia exploits its military component of 
power to exert influence on Poland. These are the 
Kaliningrad enclave problem, and the U.S. anti-missile 
shield. 
(1) Kaliningrad Enclave.  In 2000, the 
Polish authorities obtained satellite images from NATO, 
which showed a deployment of the Russian tactical nuclear 
missiles to the Kaliningrad enclave.156 This small part of 
Russia of strategic significance is encircled by Poland and 
Lithuania. The Kaliningrad enclave was at that time a closed 
militarized zone, where the Russians concentrated a 
significant number of troops. These troops being deployed 
only several kilometers from the Polish border have always 
posed a concern for Poland. Thus, the information about the 
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enclave alerted Poland, which “swiftly called international 
inspection of alleged Russian weapon stores in the 
Kaliningrad enclave.”157 
From the strategic standpoint, it was clear 
from the beginning that the Russian action was aimed not at 
Poland itself, but rather at NATO and more broadly at the 
international public opinion. Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas-a 
Polish analyst-argued that “’installation of missiles is a 
bad sign for the Baltic countries, which want to join NATO, 
but which Moscow wants to keep in its sphere of influence 
... It is a step back towards Cold War realities.’ He 
elaborated, ‘From the military point of view, the deployment 
of the tactical weapons has limited significance. However, 
the move may persuade public opinion internationally that 
NATO expansion would destabilize regional security.’"158 
Similarly, an unnamed Polish diplomat noted that “the 
alleged deployment probably served to discourage NATO from 
further eastward expansion and preserve Moscow's image as a 
military superpower despite a decline in its conventional 
forces. ‘It is a worrying sign that Moscow still treats 
Kaliningrad as a military bastion rather than a zone of 
economic cooperation with the Baltic region and the European 
Union, …’”159 
Although, the Russians rejected the 
allegations of deploying nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad 
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enclave,160 the doubts did not vanish. This case was never 
decisively concluded, partly because the Russians denied any 
international military inspections to check the allegations. 
In fact, “Kaliningrad is the only ‘western’ part of Russia 
that is not subject to the special ‘flank’ restrictions of 
the CFE Treaty, limiting troop re-deployments.”161 
Interestingly, in 2007, Russia withdrew from the CFE 
Treaty.162 
(2) Anti-missile Shield. The most recent 
“hot topic” in the Polish-Russian relationships is the issue 
of the U.S. anti-missile shield installation on the Polish 
territory. 
On August 20, 2008, the US-Polish agreement 
was signed “to install a base for 10 interceptor missiles in 
northern Poland and a radar tracking system in the Czech 
Republic to protect the United States and Europe from 
possible future attacks from what it calls ‘rogue’ 
states.”163 The Polish authorities overtly commented that 
this U.S. installation will also contribute to the Polish 
security, however, not by defending Poland against the 
missiles from “rogue” states, but by the presence of the 
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U.S. troops on Polish territory.164 Such a statement clearly 
indicated that after the NATO failure in Russia-Georgia 
conflict, Poland was seeking strengthening bilateral ties 
with USA. These ties are supposedly a more credible security 
guarantee for Poland than the NATO membership. There is also 
little doubt that the Russian action in Georgia in August 
2008, boosted the U.S.-Polish negotiations towards the 
successful end. 
Not surprisingly, the idea of deploying a 
part of the anti-missile shield in Poland has triggered a 
strongly negative Russian reaction. This time however, 
unlikely as it was earlier, Russians decided to overtly 
threaten Poland by use of nuclear weapon. The Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev stated that “the deployment of new 
missile defense facilities in Europe is aimed against the 
Russian Federation.”165 He was instantly followed by the 
Russian General Nogovitsyn who said, “By hosting these 
[anti-missile interceptor base], Poland is making itself a 
target. This is 100 per cent certain. It becomes a target 
for attack. Such targets are destroyed as a first 
priority."166 Nogovitsyn further explained that “Russian 
military doctrine sanctioned the use of nuclear weapons 
‘against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if 
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they in some way help them,’ as Poland had done in signing 
the deal.”167 The explicitly expressed threat was the 
strongest one issued by the Russian authorities since the 
Soviet Union collapsed. The Polish reaction seemed to be 
highly moderate. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski 
said that “Poland was open to Russian inspections because 
it wanted to give Moscow ‘tangible proof’ that the planned 
base was not directed against Russia.”168 There was no 
response from Moscow. 
To sum up, it can be argued that the Russians 
do not have too much military leverage on Poland. Poland is 
member of NATO and EU, so any direct military action solely 
against Poland is almost unimaginable. Nevertheless, the 
Russians are using the military rhetoric more in an attempt 
to influence the international public opinion and decision 
makers, than to change the strategic military balance. This 
was the case in the deploying of the nuclear missiles to 
Kaliningrad enclave. Regarding this action, it can be argued 
that the Russians used their military capabilities as a part 
of bigger information campaign aimed at preventing the NATO 
enlargement. One can call it a non-conventional use of 
military force. 
The latest events regarding the deployment of 
the elements of anti-missile shield in Poland showed, 
however, that Russia is not shy to use its military 
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capabilities in a more traditional manner. This time, the 
openly expressed threats against Poland, and suggestions 
that Poland became a target for the Russian nuclear forces, 
point out that Russia is on its way back to the Cold War 
rhetoric. Thus, in case of a global armed conflict, the 
possibility that Polish territory will be targeted by 
nuclear strike must be seriously taken into account. From 
this perspective, the Russian strategy shows the 
characteristics of a conventional use of military force. 
4. Russian Economic Capabilities with Regards to 
Poland 
a. Russian Energy Strategy 
In today’s economically interdependent and 
globalized world, where the major players are supranational 
companies, a state’s economic power seems to be the least 
useful mean to exert influence on other states. Even a 
powerful tool like economic sanctions is not likely to be 
efficient, unless the sanctions are introduced into being by 
a broad coalition of states for a sufficiently long period 
of time. It is hard to imagine that any unilaterally 
conducted economic action against any state can be 
successful. It seems that there are some exceptions to this 
general rule. One of the most striking examples of that was 
the Russian policy of using their natural resources, mainly 
gas and oil, as a “political weapon.”169 
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In 2003, the Russian authorities adopted a new 
energy strategy for the period up to 2020.170 In this 
document, one can find it explicitly stated that the 
Russians are going to use energy for political and economic 
control over other states and actors. The goal is that other 
actors should be dependent on Russia, while Russia should be 
at the same time independent from external influences. 
In one of the most detailed analysis of the 
Russian energy policy, Jan Leijonhielm and Robert Larsson 
argue that the actual energy policy of Russia can be 
described as an energy strategy.171 The authors identify 
three goals of the Russian energy strategy: 
Russian economic growth; 
• Increase Russian international influence; 
• Guarantee an economic independence for Russia. 
The authors conclude that Russia enjoys a huge capability to 
influence the world’s energy market; however, it has no 
capability to control it. Internally, the Russian 
authorities control almost 100% of the natural resources and 
its outflow from Russia. The energy industry is either owned 
by the state or controlled by the state. Thus, the Russian 
authorities are continuously strengthening their abilities 
to use energy as a tool for foreign policy. The record shows  
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that Russia has already used its “energy weapon” against 
countries both within and outside the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).172 
Figure 4 shows the dependence on Russian gas in 
2003. Although the data are from 2003, there was not 
substantial change in the numbers. In 2007, import from 
Russia still constitutes about 63% of the Polish 
consumption. 
 
Figure 4.   The Dependence of Various European Groups of 
States on Imports of Natural Gas from Russia in 
2003 (Ratio of Imports from the Russian 
Federation to Total Consumption) [x-axis labels 
from left to right: EU, EU-15, new EU members, 
EU candidate countries, Ukraine and Belarus].173 
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Keith C. Smith-another analyst of the Russian 
energy policy-stated in his report: 
… the current policies of the Russian government, 
under Vladimir Putin, pose a significant 
challenge, to the development t of transparent 
democratic governments and free markets in those 
countries dependent on Russia on their energy 
resources. Over the past few years, the Kremlin 
has increasingly used its energy monopoly to 
influence policies in the neighboring countries 
of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Ukraine. Russia’s national security interest, as 
defined by Putin, is to re-establish Moscow’s 
control over strategic infrastructure in the 
neighboring countries. This control is to be used 
to ensure that there are friendly governments in 
place to support Russian security and economic 
interests. It would be an exaggeration to call 
Russian economic power projection imperialism, 
but the neo-colonial characteristics of Russia’s 
foreign energy policy are readily apparent to 
those living in the immediate neighborhood.174 
Thus, how has the Russian “energy weapon” has worked 
against Poland up to date? 
b. Poland in the Russian “Pipeline Tongs” 
As it was stated earlier, the main Polish 
energetic concern is the dependence on the Russian gas. In 
light of the Russian strategy to use its energy supplies as 
a tool to exert influence, Poland must consider looking for 
diversification of its gas sources. 
The planned pipeline from Russia to Germany on the 
bottom of the Baltic Sea, currently poses a special concern 
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for the Polish authorities. To date, the main Russian 
pipeline to Poland with extension to the Western Europe has 
been the “Jamal” pipeline. The “Jamal” pipeline crosses the 
Polish territory, so Poland has been somewhat immunized to 
the Russian “energy weapon.” The reason for that is the 
Russians will have to cut off the supplies to Western Europe 
in case they would like to “punish” Poland. This seems 
unacceptable from the Russian strategic standpoint. Once the 
Baltic pipeline called “Nord Stream,” which will directly 
connect Russia with Germany and Western Europe, is built, 
Poland will become fully vulnerable to the Russian “energy 
weapon.” There are two reasons for that: (1) The “Jamal” 
pipeline will no longer be necessary to supply gas to 
Western Europe, so the Russians can freely manipulate the 
gas supplies to Poland without hurting Western Europe, (2) 
once the “Nord Stream” pipeline becomes the main road for 
the Russian gas to the West, it will financially hurt 
Poland. Poland will have to buy the Russian gas from 
Germany, which is much more expensive because of the German 
high transit fees. In addition to that, Poland will lose 
money currently earned for the Russian gas transit via the 
“Jamal” pipeline. 
Simultaneous to the “Nord Stream” project, the 
Russian company Gazprom is participating in building another 
pipeline called “South Stream.” This pipeline will connect 
Russia with Italy and Western Europe via Austria. The “South 
Stream” pipeline is competitive to the EU project of the 
“Nabucco” pipeline, which goes from the Caucasus region to 
Western Europe. In light of the Russian energy strategy, 
there is little doubt that both the “Nord Stream” and the 
“South Stream,” pipelines, which encircle the Middle Europe, 
 89
will expose countries like Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Baltic States to a direct 
Russian energy threat. Officially, the Russian authorities 
claim that both projected pipelines are necessary to avoid 
the possibility of cutting off gas supplies by “unstable” 
transit countries (e.g., Belarus, Ukraine or even Poland). 
It seems that this argument is unjust, at least regarding 
Poland. It is hard to imagine any circumstances in which the 
Polish decision to cut off the Russian gas supplies to 
Western Europe could be profitable for Poland. 
Both Russian projected pipelines also undermine 
the common EU energy policy by dividing the EU into two 
geographical areas. The first area lies outside the 
“pipeline tongs” and contains roughly the “old EU” 
countries. By building the pipelines, Russia plans to get 
direct access to its Western customers. The second area, 
inside the “pipeline tongs,” contains the new EU members as 
well as Belarus and Ukraine. These countries will become 
totally dependent on the Russian good will. In practice, it 




Figure 5.   Map of the “Nord Stream” Pipeline.175 
Although, the proponents of both pipelines argue 
that these projects are economically justifiable, only the 
cost of the offshore part of the “Nord Stream” is estimated 
at 7.4 billion Euros, what makes the project 3-4 times as 
expensive as any alternative pipeline built on ground (e.g., 
crossing Polish territory).176 It contributes to the 
suspicions that the “Nord Stream” is actually a politically 
motivated project. These suspicions are even amplified by 
such events like employment of the former German Chancellor 
Gerhard Shroder by the Nord Stream Company. This triggered a 
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wave of suspicions of corruptions within Germany because 
Gerhard Schroder at the time of being in office was 
negotiating the “Nord Stream” projects with Russians.177 
Similarly, in August 2008, the Nord Stream Company hired 
another ex-Prime Minister as a lobbyist. This time it was 
the Finnish ex-PM-Paavo Lipponen. At his time in the office, 
he strongly supported the idea of building the “Nord Stream” 
pipeline.178 
To sum up, if one will compare the assumptions of 
the Russian energy strategy with the Russian efforts to 
encircle the Middle Europe’s countries by two bypassing 
pipelines, it will become clear that the economic 
motivations for both pipeline projects are doubtful. From 
the Polish perspective, the Russian economic policy can be 
perceived as an attempt to exert consistent influence on 
Poland. The use of natural resources in order to achieve 
this goal can be labeled as an unconventional economic 
campaign, which obviously serves the strategic Russian 
interests. 
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Figure 6.   The “South Stream” and the “Nabucco” 
Pipelines.179 
c. “Conventional” Dimension of the Polish-
Russian Economic Relationships 
As far as the “conventional” dimension of the 
Polish-Russian trade relationships is concerned, Russia, 
despite its economic potential, is not the main Polish trade 
partner by significant figures. According to the data from 
the Polish Trade Ministry within the first 6 months of 2008 
Polish export to Russia was worth 2 926,9 million Euros, 
and import was worth 6 822,7 million Euros. This is 5.12% 
and 10.02% of Polish export and import respectively. 
Interestingly, 87.1% of the total Polish import from Russia 
constitutes gas and oil.180 These figures place Russia in 
the seventh position among the Polish trade partners. The 
main products imported from Russia, except gas and oil, are 
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metallurgical products (6.8% of total import from Russia) 
and chemicals (3.6% of total import from Russia).181 As far 
as Polish exports to Russia are concerned, Poland exports 
mainly machinery and mechanical equipment (35%), chemicals 
(21%), and metallurgical products (11%).182 
The above numbers clearly indicate that Russia has 
rather small “conventional” economical leverage on Poland. 
Even such problems described earlier such as the meat issue, 
are more matters of prestige than anything what could be 
really harmful for the Polish economic condition. Except for 
the gas and oil, Russia is not a source of any strategic 
goods for Poland. Thus, it can be argued that the Russian 
“conventional” economic position in Poland is relatively 
weak. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The geopolitical location of Poland was rarely 
favorable for this country. The geographical proximity of 
Russia has started to pose an increasing challenge for 
Poland since 17th century. Russia’s growing power ultimately 
threatened the further existence of Poland. This threat 
materialized in Poland’s divisions roughly 200 years ago, as 
well as in the Soviet occupancy after WWII. 
Since 1989, Poland managed to take advantage of the 
historical opportunity and assured for itself a solid place 
in the Western community (NATO and the EU). Thus, once the 
recovering Russia again adopted some characteristics of the 
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neo-imperial policy attempting to expand its sphere of 
influence over Poland, it had to deal not only with Poland 
but also with NATO and the EU. 
The examination of the Russian diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic capabilities in Poland 
shows that Russia, in order to pursue its identified foreign 
policy goals, uses its economic “stick” as a primary tool to 
exert influence on Poland. The economic capabilities are 
closely followed by the informational component of the 
Russia’s power, which provides an explanatory function for 
the Russian strategy. The diplomatic and military measures 
have relatively smaller leverage potential, although by no 
means small. 
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IV. UKRAINE-CLOSE NEAR ABROAD 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
Unlike any other state, Ukraine’s history is strongly 
interrelated with the history of Russia. As Alexander J. 
Motyl wrote: 
Ukraine cannot be understood in isolation from 
Russia, but, by the same token, Russia cannot be 
understood in isolation from Ukraine. The two 
countries define each other in a way that few 
others do. The historical interconnections 
between Ukraine and Russia have penetrated every 
aspect of the current relationship. Their 
relations are therefore complex and are likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future.183 
In fact, the Ukrainians have not enjoyed a long 
tradition of the Ukrainian statecraft. Ukraine’s national 
identity emerged at the end of the 19th century, but the 
national sentiments were too weak to produce an independent 
state. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
already independent Ukrainians often had been called an 
“unexpected nation.”184 Why? Andrew Wilson argues that 
“Ukraine was then considered to be an unlikely candidate as 
a new nation, given its pronounced patterns of ethnic, 
linguistic, religious and regional diversity.”185 So, what 
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was the mechanism, which contributed to the emergence of 
independent Ukraine? One possible explanation is that the 
fall of the Soviet Union contributed to an enormous 
confusion among the former Soviet leaders. Thus, “… both 
Yeltsin and Kravchuk accepted that ‘if we go to the people 
and announce that there is no Union and propose nothing in 
its place-there will be inevitable explosion. [Some] variant 
is necessary. Transitional.’”186 Hence, it can be argued 
that the independent Ukraine has emerged as a transitional 
entity in order to prevent further confusion within society, 
and to buy a time for the USSR resurrection.187 But, once 
triggered, the powerful nationalistic forces quickly 
transformed Ukraine into a fully independent state. The 
independence referendum took place on December 1, 1991, and 
brought decisive victory to the independence supporters. 
Even the traditionally pro-Russian Crimea population voted 
“yes.” Historians noted that, “the old guards were still in 
charge, a little dazed perhaps, but still perfectly capable 
of looking after their own interests.”188 
Thus, having in mind the close historical ties 
between Ukraine and Russia, it is a truth that today’s 
relationships between both countries are decisively shaped 
by a common historical experience. With regards to that, 
special attention needs to be paid to the period when the 
Ukrainians and the Russians were unified within the Soviet 
Union. 
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2. Ukraine as a Part of the Soviet Union 
On December 22, 1922, the Soviet Union was formed. The 
previously independent Socialistic Republic of the Eastern 
Ukraine became formally a part of the newly created Union. 
Along with the strengthening of the communist rules in the 
Soviet Union, the idea of promoting the national elements 
(language, culture, etc.) in Ukraine emerged within the 
communist leadership. This was labeled as the Ukrainization 
policy, and it was the communist tactical move taken in 
order to facilitate the communist propaganda. 
The famine in 1921-22, which affected Ukraine, was 
exploited by communists to justify their fight against 
religion and clergy. A New Economical Policy introduced by 
Lenin eased the tension in rural areas, and improved the 
economical situation, but Stalin’s seizure of power turned 
the clock back in Ukraine. In 1928, the communist 
authorities started a big industrialization program followed 
by forced collectivization of the agriculture. The peasants’ 
resistance was crushed by massive repressions, including an 
artificially imposed famine, which claimed about 4.5 to 8 
million lives.189 The brutal repressions were followed by 
equally drastic Russianization policy. This included 
eradication of the Ukrainian language, devastation of the 
Ukrainian antiquities, and physical extermination of priests 
of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. During the period of “big 
terror” in USSR (1935-1938), Ukraine suffered heavily. Only 
the First Secretary of the Communist Ukrainian Party-Nikita  
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Krushchev slightly eased the oppressiveness of the security 
forces, while at the same time strengthening the 
Russianization processes.190 
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, 
Ukraine became an arena for the most devastating military 
operations in history. The retreating Soviets adopted a 
“scorched earth policy,” and three years later the Germans 
repeated exactly the same scenario to stop the advancing Red 
Army. Some estimates say that during the Second World War, 
Ukraine suffered about 5 million civilian deaths.191 
Paradoxically, despite of these horrible human losses, the 
final outcome of WWII can be perceived as somewhat 
beneficial to Ukraine. This is because the winning Soviet 
Union expanded its boundaries, thus Ukraine got some 
territorial gains (e.g., the Eastern part of Galicia, 
Volhynia, Bessarabia or Transcarpathia). This territorial 
expansion increased Ukraine’s land area by about 25%, and 
the population by about 11 million people.192 
After WWII, the Russianization policy was quickly 
resumed by Stalin’s regime. This included massive 
deportations of “uncertain elements” like the Cossacks or 
the returning prisoners of war. The repressions were stopped 
after Stalin’s death. In 1954, the Soviets exploited the 
300-year anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, to 
highlight the “age-old brotherly love of Ukrainians and 
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Russians.”193 As a proof for the love and trust between 
these two nations, the communists decide to include Crimea 
into the Ukrainian Republic.194 In reality, this act had no 
real meaning. The break in a harsh Russianization had lasted 
to early 1970s, when this policy was once again resumed by a 
new First Secretary-Leonid Brezhnev. 
The re-Russianization policy contributed to the 
resurgence of the nationalistic ideas in Ukraine. This time, 
however, the nationalists joined their efforts with the 
democratic activists; the illegal papers-so called 
“samizdat”-were widespread. Ukraine also witnessed the 
resurgence of religious faith: the Orthodox, Unity, and 
Catholic Churches revived. It can be argued, however, that 
the decisive event, which stimulated the Ukrainian national 
awareness, was the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986. Moscow’s 
typical old-fashioned communist reaction to this disaster 
shattered the Ukrainian public opinion, and it triggered 
wave of massive protests.195 This in turn provided the basis 
for emergence of more organized social movements, among 
which the Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine for 
Reconstruction) gained mass popularity. The Rukh movement 
won 100 seats in the 450-seat Supreme Soviet in Ukraine in 
the 1990 elections. This success attracted some communists 
to the Rukh, which allowed passing an independence 
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declaration on July 16, 1990.196 This status quo was firmly 
confirmed by the independence referendum in 1991, where 92% 
of voters said “yes” to Ukraine’s independence with 
participation of 80% of the eligible population voting.197 
3. Post-Soviet Era 
a. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
As was stated earlier in this chapter, in December 
1991, the former communist apparatchiks-the then Presidents 
of Russia and Ukraine-Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin, 
decided that there was a need to create a transitional 
political entity to replace the failing Soviet Union. This 
idea was introduced in December 1991, when the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) was established. Twelve out of 
fifteen of the former Soviet republics became members of the 
CIS (three Baltic republics decided not to join, and Georgia 
joined as late as 1993). Interestingly, although Ukraine was 
among the founders of the CIS, it has never ratified the 
charter of the CIS, so formally has not been a member of the 
CIS to date.198 
From the beginning however, many of the CIS’s 
members were interested in transferring to the CIS as little 
power as possible. This attitude reflected the fears of 
creating a kind of “new Soviet Union,” which could limit its 
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members’ independence. At the same time, however, the former 
Soviet republics recognized the necessity for close economic 
cooperation. The close economic cooperation was somewhat 
enforced by the heritage of the Soviet centralized economy 
(e.g., not all industrial branches were developed in all 
republics).199 Thus, it can be argued that there was an 
economic reasoning which convinced many of the CIS members 
to join this organization. This notion was best reflected in 
the Ukraine’s attitude to the CIS’s role. According to the 
Ukrainian point of view, establishment of the CIS was only a 
preparation to a “civilized divorce.”200 A similar attitude 
was more or less adopted by other newly emerged independent 
states. The only exception was Russia, which was interested 
in closer integration within CIS under the Russian 
leadership.201 
b. “Orange Revolution” 
Even from the short four-year long perspective, 
there is little doubt that the Presidential election in 
Ukraine in 2004 was one of the most significant events in 
the Ukraine’s history. This election was a plebiscite for 
the future place of Ukraine in the international community.  
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The pro-Russian orientation was represented by acting Prime 
Minister Victor Yanukovych, while Victor Yushchenko was the 
leader of the pro-Western party. 
Both candidates scored roughly equally in the 
first round, so the second round was to determine the new 
President. The pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovych got a 
strong support from the outgoing President Kravchuk as well 
as from the Russian President Putin. Despite that support, 
the pre-voting polls were showing 11% lead of the pro-
Western candidate. In the period of time between the first 
and second round, and especially a day before the second 
round, rumors about the authorities’ preparations for the 
vote-rigging were widespread. The officially announced 
Yanukovych’s victory, triggered a wave of massive protests. 
The elections frauds and abuses were confirmed by 
independent observers, and then officially by the Ukrainian 
Supreme Court, which also ordered the re-run of the vote. 
The repeated election brought decisive victory to Victor 
Yushchenko (52% against 44% for Yanukovych). All these 
events were later labeled “Orange Revolution.”202 
It can be argued that the significance of the 
“Orange Revolution” has two dimensions. First, it brought a 
victory to the party which saw Ukraine’s place in the 
Western community, rather than at the Russia’s side. This 
constitutes a geo-strategic dimension. Second, the 
“unexpected nation”203-the Ukrainians, for the first time 
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experienced their own power since independence was declared 
in 1991. Thus, the “Orange Revolution” was priceless in 
terms of creating a genuine civil society in Ukraine. This 
constitutes the social dimension of the revolution. 
B. RUSSIAN DIME TOWARDS UKRAINE 
1. Russian Diplomatic Capabilities in Ukraine 
As was stated in the previous chapter, diplomacy is the 
main tool for accomplishing foreign policy goals. Therefore, 
examination of the Russian diplomatic capabilities in 
Ukraine should be preceded by identification of the Russian 
foreign policy goals in Ukraine. 
Similarly, as in the Polish case, the Russian foreign 
policy towards Ukraine adopted some characteristics of a 
neo-imperial policy. It seemed that the main Russian goals 
in Ukraine were: (1) to keep Ukraine in the Russian zone of 
influence, (2) to prevent Ukraine from joining the Western 
political and military alliances like NATO or the EU, (3) to 
strengthen the Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia. 
There are, however, some significant differences between the 
Polish and the Ukrainian situation. The most important are 
the following. 
• Ukraine is not a member of NATO nor the EU 
• Ukraine was formerly a part of the Soviet Union 
• Ukraine has a large Russian diaspora 
• Ukraine has the Russian troops on its territory 
(Black Sea Fleet) 




It can be argued that each of these facts can be labeled the 
Ukrainian Achilles’ Heel with regard to its relationship 
with Russia. This makes Ukraine far more vulnerable to the 
Russian political pressure than Poland is. 
The Russian authorities employ both classic and 
unconventional diplomatic means to accomplish their goals in 
Ukraine. The classic Russian diplomacy towards Ukraine 
includes mainly cooperation within CIS, by that Russia 
attempts both to strengthen its ties with Ukraine, and to 
weaken the pro-Western sympathies in Ukraine. In the 
following paragraph the Ukrainian presidential election in 
2004 will be examined to show how the Russians used their 
diplomatic capabilities to exert influence on Ukraine in an 
unconventional way. 
a. Russian Interference in the Ukrainian 
Presidential Election in 2004 
One of the most obvious examples of the Russian 
active diplomacy was their interference in the presidential 
election process in Ukraine in 2004. 
This election “was considered a crossroads by the 
Russian elite since choosing the country’s future was on the 
agenda. Ukraine faced integration with the Euro-Atlantic 
structures or close economic cooperation with Russia….”204 
Thus, “Russia set only one goal: to keep Ukraine in the 
sphere of Russian influence, and, at a minimum, to maintain 
their existing relationship. Any other option was ruled 
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out.”205 The way to achieve to this goal led through the 
active diplomatic measures aimed at supporting any pro-
Russian candidate. Moscow’s strategy “was based on the 
premise that the centerpiece of the upcoming election would 
be… a confrontation between eastern Ukraine, drawn toward 
friendship with Russia, and the nationalistic western part 
of Ukraine.”206 The Russians pursued this strategy into two 
general directions. The first one was an active 
participation of the Russian specialist in the Yanukovych 
election campaign (e.g., Gleb Pavlovsky-advisor to the 
Putin’s presidential administration or Vyacheslav Nikonov-
influential Russian political consultant). The second one 
was based on making some economic and political concessions 
to highlight the importance of the Ukraine-Russia 
cooperation, in order to strengthen the pro-Russian 
party.207 Interestingly, 
Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the 
presidential administration’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs was involved. Only branches 
dealing with domestic politics took part, as was 
usual for important missions in the post-Soviet 
space. A peculiarity of the Ukrainian 
presidential campaign was that it was headed by 
the chief of the Kremlin administration. This 
underlined the importance President Putin 
attached to the Ukrainian election….208 
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During the presidential campaign, the Russian officials 
exploited some channels of influence. Two most important 
were the Yanukovych’s campaign headquarters: the official 
one in Donetsk, and the unofficial one known as the “Russian 
Club” in Kyiv. The first one gave the Russians direct access 
to Yanukovych where the work of the Russian political 
consultants was directly supervised by Vyacheslav Nikonov. 
The second one, the “Russian Club,” organized a rather 
classic political campaign, including meetings with voters, 
leaflets actions, etc.209 Shortly, before the voting day the 
Russian authorities, being aware of the uncertain 
Yanukovych’s position, decided to influence the elections by 
organizing President Putin’s visit to Kyiv. This visit was 
supposed to convince the “unconvinced,” and “create a 
turning point in the campaign just before the election.”210 
Despite the Russian efforts, the first voting 
round did not bring decisive victory to any candidate, so 
the second round was necessary. Once again, President Putin 
decided to visit Ukraine. This time he met with outgoing 
President Kuchma and Yanukovych on Crimea. “During this 
visit, Yanukovych was reportedly advised to rely mostly on 
administrative interference: to maximize the voter turnout 
in the regions that supported Yanukovych in the first round, 
while replacing disloyal local officials with more 
industrious bureaucrats in other regions.”211 Additionally, 
the Russian authorities undertook some measures to convince 
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those candidates, who lost the first round, to transfer 
their support to Yanukovych. Especially well known in this 
context was the mission of the Russian Communists’ leader-
Valery Ziuganov, who was asked to convince the Communist 
Party leader in Ukraine-Petro Symonenko to support 
Yanukovych.212 
Despite all, the well known final outcome of the 
presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 can be called 
disastrous in terms of the Russian strategic goals. The 
“Orange Revolution” pushed Ukraine towards the West, while 
undermining the Russian credibility both in Ukraine and in 
the eyes of international community. 
The multi-level Russian involvement in the 
presidential election campaign in Ukraine in 2004 is 
unquestionable. The Russians used their diplomatic 
capabilities in Ukraine in a very unusual way, without 
employing the institutions responsible for pursuing foreign 
policy (e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs). As was mentioned 
earlier, in the former Soviet hemisphere, it is rather a 
common Russian behavior, but from the standpoint of classic 
diplomacy, it seems to be a highly unconventional approach. 
2. Russian Informational Capabilities in Ukraine 
In comparison to Poland, the Russian informational 
capabilities in Ukraine are far more powerful. The Russian 
language is widely spoken in Ukraine, so the Russian 
newspapers, radio and TV stations have access to the 
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Ukrainian society. In addition to that, a huge Russian 
ethnic minority is concentrated in the Eastern Ukraine, 
especially on the Crimea Peninsula. These people openly 
express their sympathy to Russia, so the Russian cultural, 
spiritual and informational influences find a fertile ground 
there. All these factors facilitate the Russian public 
diplomacy and other classic informational activities. 
The presence of the Russian diaspora in Ukraine also 
gives the Russians an opportunity to use that “Crimea card” 
in informational campaigns abroad, mainly aimed at 
preventing Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU.213 
a. Russian Diaspora in Crimea-Russian leverage 
on Ukraine 
Although Russia has formally recognized the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine,214 the pro-Western turn in 
Ukraine’s policy after the Orange Revolution, and especially 
the strong support given by Ukraine to Georgia after the 
Russian invasion in 2008, changed the Russian attitude. As 
Vladimir Socor noted: 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and senior members of 
Russia’s Duma persist in making territorial 
claims to Sevastopol, following Luzhkov’s foray 
into the Ukrainian territory of the Crimea. These 
continuing statements appear designed to question 
Ukraine’s sovereignty in Sevastopol, and more 
broadly in the Crimea, at the Russian-Ukrainian 
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level and even internationally. Russia’s 
executive branch of government is itself moving, 
albeit less demonstratively than the politicians, 
from unqualified recognition of Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity to a qualified recognition, 
contingent on Ukraine’s decisions with regard to 
Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol and Ukraine-
NATO relations. Russia is building leverage to 
pressure Ukraine on those issues by questioning 
the territorial status quo.215 
The new Russian attitude was even more explicitly 
expressed by Luzhkov, who said that “Ukraine thinks that the 
Crimea belongs to Ukraine and that Sevastopol also does. I 
say that this state has no grounds whatsoever for 
appropriating the Crimea and Sevastopol.”216 In light of the 
changing Russian view on the territorial status quo in the 
Crimea Peninsula, it can be argued that “Moscow seems 
interested in generating some kind of bilateral or 
international debate about the status of the Crimea and 
Sevastopol.”217 Thus, it can be said that Russia is using 
the “Crimea card” in a broader context, both to influence 
domestic politics in Ukraine, and “to help those in NATO and 
the EU who oppose Ukrainian membership in their 
organizations.”218 
The Russian informational activities with regard 
to the Russian diaspora are based on two pillars. The first 
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pillar is focused on depicting the Russians in Ukraine as 
the “oppressed” minority.219 This strategy is aimed mainly 
at the international public opinion and policymakers, and 
its goal is to provide a justification for the Russian 
involvement in Ukraine under a cover of protecting the 
Russian diaspora. It seems however, that the Russian notion 
of “oppressed minority” is not very well grounded in 
reality. Stephen Velychenko argues that: 
If Russians are “oppressed” how, in Donetsk 
province, where 38% of the population are Russian 
speaking Russians, can there be approximately 
1000 Russian-language newspapers and magazines 
and one Ukrainian language newspaper?....How can 
Russians be “oppressed” in a country where, 
although they are not more than 20% of the 
population, the media,…, was still overwhelmingly 
Russian? Only 10% of Ukraine’s annual published 
book titles, 12% of its magazines, 18% of its TV 
programs and 35% of its newspapers were in 
Ukrainian. These figures would be even lower if 
totals included Russian-language products and 
programming imported/broadcast from Russia. 
Foreign non-Russian corporations in Ukraine, 
finally, function in Russian.220 
The second pillar is oriented towards changing the 
ethnic ratio in Crimea in the Russian favor by distribution 
of Russian passports among the society.221 So, the 
“Ukrainian authorities have become highly sensitive to the 
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threat of a Russian policy of destabilization since the 
Kremlin invasion of Georgia. One particular area of concern 
is the issuing of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in 
light of Russia’s pretext of coming to the “defense” of 
Russian citizens in the two frozen conflicts [South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia] where Russia had illegally distributed 
passports.”222 An influential Ukrainian deputy, Borys 
Tarasiuk, openly called “the distribution of passports as 
Russia’s ‘secret aggression against Ukrainian citizens.’”223 
To sum up, it can be argued that the Russians have 
very significant informational capabilities in Ukraine. They 
use the classic informational tools to strengthen the 
Russian cultural influence domestically in Ukraine. At the 
same time the Russian policymakers are using the “Crimea 
card” to prevent Ukraine from orienting toward the West. The 
informational dimension of this strategy has some 
characteristics of disinformation (the notion of “oppressed 
diaspora”), as well as active measures (handling Russian 
passports). Both these actions can be labeled as 
unconventional information campaign against Ukraine. 
3. Russian Military Capabilities in Ukraine 
Ukraine’s Defense Doctrine is the key document on which 
the Ukrainian defense policy is based. This doctrine was 
assumed in 1993, and slightly modified in 2004. According to 
this document, the threat to Ukraine is defined as every 
“state whose consistent policy presents a military threat . 
                     
222 Taras Kuzio, “Russian Passports as Moscow’s Geopolitical Tool,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 5, no. 176 (September 15 2008), 
http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&s
id=6032558&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 (accessed October 14, 2008). 
223 Ibid. 
 112
. . [or] leads to interference in the internal affairs of 
Ukraine, or encroaches on its territorial integrity and its 
national interests.”224 It is easy to notice that the earlier 
discussed examples of the Russian diplomatic and 
informational campaigns fit the cited passage very well. 
Thus, what about the Russian military? Does it pose a direct 
and realistic threat to Ukraine? 
It can be argued that the Russian-Ukrainian military 
relationships are almost entirely determined by a single 
factor, namely the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). The BSF is 
a Soviet heritage, which is currently used as a powerful 
Russian lever on Ukraine. 
In 1997, the Partition Treaty was signed between 
Ukraine and Russia, according to which the Soviet Black Sea 
Fleet was divided between Ukraine and Russia. According to 
this Treaty, Ukraine agreed to lease its territory and 
facilities for the Russian part of the BSF up to 2017. Thus, 
the Russians assured a 20-year presence on the Ukrainian 
soil for their 15,000 troops at the Naval Base in 
Sevastopol. This Russian presence on the Crimean Peninsula 
has not caused any problems for almost 10 years. Only the 
Orange Revolution and subsequent Ukraine’s foreign policy 
reorientation towards the West changed this calm. The 
Russians decided to adopt some active measures in their 
policy towards Ukraine, and one of the strongest tools 
available to the Russians was the Black Sea Fleet.225 
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The “BSF tool” has been used particularly intensively 
in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict in September 
2008. Some of the BSF’s warships anchored close to the 
Georgian coast were participating in the Russian invasion. 
The Ukraine’s authorities, strongly supported Georgia 
backlash as evidenced by President Yushchenko speech at that 
time in Tbilisi. The Ukrainian government confirmed in May 
2008, the earlier decision not to expand the BFE stationing 
agreement beyond the year 2017. In addition to that, 
Ukraine’s President, Victor Yushchenko, obliged the 
Ukrainian government to finish the work on the final 
delimitating of the Ukraine-Russian border on both the Black 
Sea and the Sea of Azov. These steps were followed by 
Yushchenko’s decree which “requires Russia`s Black Sea Fleet 
to submit a request to return to its base in the Crimea 10 
working days before its planned return [from the Georgian 
territorial waters].”226 This decree was then expanded 
“requiring prior notification from Russia of all movements 
by naval vessels and aircraft from Sevastopol.”227 
All these Ukrainian steps have been perceived in Russia 
as an ultimate confirmation of Ukraine’s strategic decision 
to affiliate with the West. Thus, it can be argued that the 
Russian authorities decided to use the BSF as another lever 
for pressure on Ukraine. Some commentators argue that 
“Russia is using the dispute [over BSF] to play on deep 
divisions in Ukraine’s fractious ‘Orange coalition,’ while 
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also trying to delay or prevent Ukraine from acceding to 
NATO.”228 In general, the “Russia’s strategy is to extend 
discussions in the hope that supposedly Moscow-friendly 
forces will control the Ukrainian government in 2017 and 
will agree to extend the basing agreement.”229 
From the military perspective, the BSF has little 
significance. What makes it a powerful lever is its 
symbolical meaning. The BSF, with bases in Sevastopol, a 
city symbolizing heroism and patriotism for the Russians, 
feeds the Ukrainians’ fear of possible separatism in Crimea. 
This is the reason the dispute over BSF resonates so 
strongly both in Moscow and Kiev.230 
To sum up, it is necessary to underline that the 
Russian foreign policy is highly cohesive and employs 
different dimensions of national power to accomplish well 
defined strategic goals. As far as the military dimension is 
concerned, Russia uses its BSF basing in Crimea to exert 
political pressure on Ukraine rather than a military one. 
From this perspective, the military presence of the Russian 
troops on the Ukrainian soil is exploited in a non-
conventional way (e.g., non-military). With regard to the 
classic use of military power, it seems that the Russian 
authorities cautiously avoid threatening Ukraine, at least  
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as long as Ukraine is still not in NATO. Once there, Ukraine 
will likely a target for the direct Russian military 
pressure. 
4. Russian Economic Capabilities in Ukraine 
The common Soviet past is still a main factor which 
shapes the economic relationships between Ukraine and 
Russia. The statistics show that Russia is a main trade 
partner for Ukraine, absorbing 25.7% of Ukraine’s export, 
and giving 27.8% of Ukraine’s import.231 As with the Polish 
case, natural resources (mainly gas) contribute to about 80% 
of the Russian export to Ukraine. Ukraine has a monopoly on 
the sale of Russian gas across Europe, because of the 
Russian pipelines crossing its territory. In contrast, 
Russia almost completely controls the flow of gas to 
Ukraine. 
In early 2005, almost immediately after Orange 
Revolution, Gazprom began talks with Ukraine on increasing 
the gas prices. Although there was a valid agreement 
assuring Ukraine a low price (50 USD per thousand cubic 
meters [tcm]) of gas supplies up to 2009, Gazprom requested 
prices as high as 160 USD per tcm, and in late 2005 even 230 
per tcm.232 Gazprom officials argued that 50 USD per tcm was 
far below the market price. Ukraine fiercely rejected this 
request pointing out the valid contract. So “President Putin 
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in late December stated that Russia’s ‘fraternal ties’ with 
Ukraine dictated his open intervention, and he offered a 
loan to Ukraine to help it pay for the higher priced gas. 
When Ukraine rejected this proposal, Russian state 
television showed Putin and Gazprom head, Aleksey Miller, 
(one of Putin’s long-time associates) agreeing on December 
31 to cut off supplies to Ukraine.”233 The Ukraine’s 
reaction was to compensate by taking gas which was 
designated for European consumers. This action in turn 
provoked “Gazprom to accuse Ukraine of ‘stealing’ [gas] and 
of being an unreliable transit country. Ukraine argued 
variously that it was continuing a long-time arrangement of 
taking gas as a transit fee in lieu of cash or that it was 
taking delivery of gas provided by Turkmenistan.”234 
Although the gas conflict was quickly resolved, mainly 
because of the European countries’ protests, the Russians 
managed to force Ukraine to buy the Russian gas by an 
intermediary firm, RosUkrEnergo. About 50% shares of this 
firm belong to Gazprom, while the shareholders of the rest 
remain undisclosed. This situation raises concerns that the 
RosUkrEnergo shares can be owned by some Russian and 
Ukrainian officials as well as by organized crime 
individuals.235 The new gas price was established at the 
level of 95 USD per tcm. 
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It can be said that both sides found themselves in a 
stalemate because the Russian “gas weapon” was balanced by 
the Ukraine’s ownership of the pipelines. The gas conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia in 2005 was by far not the last 
stage of the “energy war.” In 2007 and 2008, the Russians 
exerted a firm pressure on Ukraine forcing once again higher 
gas prices. President Yushchenko in turn called for 
elimination of RosUkrEnergo as a redundant proxy. This time 
however, the Russians did not encounter such a sharp 
Ukraine’s reaction as in 2005. Two factors contributed to 
that: (1) the political situation in Ukraine was already 
significantly different with the growing popularity of the 
opposition pro-Russian Party of Regions, and (2) the 
Ukrainians could not afford to endanger their credibility on 
international stage once again. Moreover, the Russian plans 
to build pipelines bypassing Ukraine (Nord and South 
Streams) made Ukrainians aware of the possible loss of their 
pipeline lever on Russia. Thus, some analysts argued that in 
the worst case scenario, Ukraine was seriously considering 
using another pressure on Russia, namely preventing the 
Russians from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Russia had unsuccessfully attempted to join WTO for several 
years. There are chances that Ukraine will become a member 
of WTO earlier than Russia allegedly with the USA and the EU 
support. Once a WTO member, the decision to admit Russia to 
WTO will be in the Ukraine’s hands. The reason for that is 
an admission of new country requires unanimous approval of 
all WTO members.236 
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The analysis of the Ukraine-Russia economic 
relationships shows that the word “economic” can be highly 
deceptive. It can be argued that Russia and Ukraine are in a 
state of protracted political confrontation, where the 
economy, mainly gas supplies in this case, serves pure 
political goals as in few other places on the world’s map. 
The Russians use their “gas weapon” eagerly, while the 
Ukrainians try to exploit all available pressures on Russia 
to counter this. 
In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Georgia, 
the tension between both countries grew even stronger. In 
the economic area this growing tension was reflected in the 
Russian ban on the Ukrainian powdered milk introduced in 
August 2008. Earlier in this year, the Russians introduced 
some restrictions on the Ukrainian meat and cheese import, 
and are currently threatening to do the same with alcohol, 
which can seriously hurt the Ukraine’s economy.237 
Thus, it can be argued that the economic relationships 
between Ukraine and Russia are highly dependent on current 
political situation and economic activities. The economy is 
simply subservient to politics. It seems that the active 
side in this “game” is Russia, while weaker Ukraine reacts 
defensively. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Ukraine, as with every young state, must find its own 
path of development to secure itself a safe place among 
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other states and prosperity for its citizens. In 2004, the 
Ukrainians chose what they saw as the future of their 
country in the Western hemisphere. This choice was not 
welcomed in Moscow, where the Russian authorities still seem 
to perceive the world’s politics as a zero sum game, meaning 
that the Russians see only two options for Ukraine, (1) to 
be a part of the West, thus against Russia, (2) to be in the 
Russian zone of influence, thus against the West. The Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine finally convinced the Russian 
authorities that Ukraine is drifting towards the West, so 
the Russians adopted some active measures to reverse this 
trend. In addition to the classic diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic measures, the Russians employed a 
broad spectrum of unconventional means. 
It can be argued that in Ukraine, which is neither a 
NATO nor EU member, the Russians are allowed to operate more 
openly and aggressively. The pivotal point in the Russian 
strategy is Crimea where a huge Russian ethnic minority 
constitutes a de facto majority, and where the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet is based. The Russian authorities seem to pursue a 
coherent policy aimed at using these two facts to pressure 
the Ukrainians in order to change the Ukraine’s political 
choices. Moreover, the “gas weapon” is also of use in the 
Russian hands. All these measures adopted by Russia can be 
labeled unconventional use of DIME. 
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V. GEORGIA-TOO CLOSE NEAR ABROAD 
A. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Georgia-A Part of the Transcaucasus Ethnic Pot 
The Transcaucasus region seems to be politically one of 
the most unstable regions of modern-day Europe. Today, the 
Transcaucasus comprises three countries: Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, and Georgia and is home for numerous ethnic groups. 
This land-bridge between Europe and Asia has always 
been perceived by regional powers as strategic for their 
interests. The Russians labeled Transcaucasus their “soft 
underbelly.”238 In different historical periods the Ottoman 
Empire, the Persian Empire, and Russia executed control over 
this region. Each of these powers had to take into account 
the fact that the homogenous, old, and proud Georgian nation 
had been living there for centuries. Surprisingly, despite 
the powerful neighbors’ influences, the Georgians managed 
not only to survive as a nation, but were also able to 
establish and secure its own state for an impressively long 
time. This status quo changed in the beginning of 19th 
century when Georgia along with a better half of the 
Transcaucasus was absorbed into the Russian Empire. Despite 
everything, even as a part of both the Russian and then 
Soviet Empires, the Georgian nation cultivated its 
traditions and sustained a sense of national identity. A 
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strong national awareness enabled the Georgians to quickly 
reestablish an independent state after the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire. The burst of the Georgian nationalism highly 
concerned leadership of two Georgian autonomous regions, 
namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both these regions, to 
which the autonomy was granted by the Georgian authorities, 
started to pursue a policy oriented towards either 
unification with Russia or independence.239 
In order to understand the roots of the ethnic 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is necessary to 
stretch back this investigation to the period of Stalin’s 
reign. Stalin, as a head of a state composed of hundreds of 
ethnic groups (USSR), was fully aware that nationalism could 
be a deadly threat for his Empire. Thus, the overall ethnic 
policy pursued by Stalin was aimed at oppressing any 
nationalistic sentiments and tendencies within USSR. To 
accomplish this goal, the communist apparatus directed by 
Stalin exterminated, deported or resettled whole nations 
across the Soviet Union. The republic’s boundaries within 
USSR were drawn on the map, often personally by Stalin, 
deliberately violating the ethnic pattern on the ground. In 
accordance with the old rule divide et impera Stalin pursued 
establishment of Soviet republics and autonomous regions by 
division of the homogenous ethnic areas. As a result the 
boundaries of the Soviet republics were drawn in a manner, 
which created within each administrative unit one or more 
ethnic minority enclave.240 
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Although Georgia was Stalin’s ethnic motherland, it 
fell victim to the same national policy as many other 
regions. Stalin did not hesitate to suppress potential 
bursts of Georgian nationalism by creating within the 
Georgian Soviet republic two enclaves, namely the Abkhaz 
Associated Republic and the South Ossetian autonomous 
region.241 Stalin’s policy decisively contributed to the 
present ethnic tension in these two Georgian regions. 
 
Figure 7.   Map of Georgia with Autonomous Regions 
Marked.242 
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2. The Rose Revolution 
Parliamentary elections in Georgia in 2003 became the 
breakthrough, both for this country, and its northern 
neighbor-Russia. Social discontent as a direct result of 
suspicions of the parliamentary electoral fraud, combined 
with a disastrous economic condition of the country, massive 
corruption and widespread lawlessness, particularly in the 
separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, triggered 
massive protests against the government of President Eduard 
Shevardnadze. The several weeks long protests led by a well 
organized opposition with Mikhail Saakashvili as a leader, 
finally swept away Eduard Shevardnadze. Consequently, the 
presidential elections in January 2004, brought victory to 
Mikhail Saakashvili. These events were later called the Rose 
Revolution.243 
The rapid and rather unexpected political change in 
Georgia, which brought power to the pro-Western opposition, 
strengthened the Russian perception that external powers 
were trying to exert influence over the Transcaucasus, and 
Georgia particularly. This impression was even reinforced by 
the political agenda of the new Georgian authorities, which 
highlighted the necessity to join NATO and a need to pursue 
an independent energy policy. 
Thus, there was little surprise that Russia’s reaction 
to this dangerous political shift in its “soft underbelly” 
was firm. The Russians activated all available means of 
influence to minimize the effects of the Rose Revolution. In 
the following passages of this chapter the most stunning 
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examples of the Russian policy will be described. For the 
sake of a better understanding of the Russian reaction, it 
seems necessary to present a short analysis of the main 
Russian foreign policy goals in the Transcaucasus and in 
Georgia especially. 
B. THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS 
The term “soft underbelly” tells almost everything 
about how important the Transcaucasus region is for Russia. 
The special place in this region belongs to Georgia, which 
has a longest border with Russia. It can be argued that the 
main Russian interests in Georgia, and more broadly in the 
Transcaucasus, are concentrated around four pillars: (1) 
maintaining stability in the region, (2) ensuring the 
Russian military presence and political dominance, (3) 
tightening the economic ties with Russia, (4) protecting the 
Russian diaspora in the region. 
The land bridge between Black and Caspian Sea, and 
especially the Caucasus Mountains have been for ages a 
natural boundary between Russia and the Muslim world. The 
concerns in Moscow about spreading radical Islam were fueled 
by the situation in Chechnya. The war in Chechnya 
contributed to the instability of the whole region, 
resulting in rising violence in Dagestan, Ingushetia or 
North Ossetia. So, the Russians have simply perceived the 







terrorism and instability can easily enter Russia, 
triggering more secessionist problems similar to those ones, 
with which Russia must deal in Chechnya.244 
Moscow has also considered the stability in the 
Transcaucasus as a function of the Russia’s ability to 
control this region. Thus, any external influences have been 
unwelcome, either from Asia (radical Islam) or from the 
Western hemisphere. With regards to the later, “Moscow is 
seeking to prevent Georgia’s integration into transatlantic 
security structures. Russia also wants to achieve a much 
greater geostrategic objective: to close the strategic 
access route to the heartland of the Eurasian continent for 
Western interests.”245 
As far as the Russian military presence in Georgia is 
concerned, the Russians assumed control of the former Soviet 
military bases in Georgia in 1991. Initially, the number of 
the Russian troops was about 20,000, and gradually decreased 
to about 3000 in 2007. The main Russian bases in Georgia 
were located in Akhalkalaki, Batumi and Tbilisi. After the 
Rose Revolution, the presence of the Russian troops in 
Georgia became a serious source of friction between both 
countries. In March 2005, the Georgian Parliament issued a 
resolution calling for withdrawal of the Russian troops. The 
Russian authorities tried to negotiate a prolongation of the 
presence of Russian troops, but encountered a strong 
Georgian denial. At the summit in Sochi in 2006, Georgia, 
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being supported by Western countries, achieved a great 
success; the Russians agreed to withdraw its forces from 
their bases in Georgia no later than in January 2008. In 
late 2007, the withdrawal of the Russian troops was 
completed. Despite that, the Russian troops have been 
present as the peacekeeping forces in the break-away 
republic of Abkhazia.246 
Similarly, as it was in both the Polish and Ukrainian 
cases, the economic relations between Russia and Georgia 
were almost exclusively an issue of natural resources trade. 
Before the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was built in 2006, 
Georgia was fully dependent on the gas and oil as well as on 
the electricity supplies from Russia. Georgia also plays a 
major role as a transit country for gas and oil from Central 
Asia to Turkey and Europe. Excepting the natural resources 
trade, the economic ties between Georgia and Russia have 
been relatively weak, but still much more significant for 
Georgia than Russia. The main Georgian export products to 
Russia include wine, agricultural products, mineral water, 
coal and different minerals. 
Similar to the Ukrainian case, protection of the 
Russian diaspora in Georgia became, at least declaratively, 
is a central issue for the Russian policymakers. Although 
the Russians represent only 6% of the population of Georgia, 
their presence there has been used as a justification for 
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the Russian involvement.247 The “ethnic card” is still used 
by Russians for pressure on Georgia, both internally and at 
the international stage. 
C. RUSSIAN DIME TOWARDS GEORGIA-“M” TAKES PRIORITY 
In August 2008, the tension between Georgia and Russia 
culminated in an open military confrontation, which was 
launched by Georgia’s attack on the break-away South Ossetia 
republic. Along with the immediate Russian military 
intervention in Georgia, the Russian DIME both conventional 
and unconventional merged into one big “M.” It can be argued 
that in the aftermath of this short but intense military 
conflict, the relationships between both countries have been 
frozen. However, it seems that it can be a valuable lesson 
to study how the tension between Georgia and Russia was 
evolving up to the point of military confrontation. 
Thus, in the following passages the chronology of the 
Russian-Georgian relationships will be presented with a 
special emphasis on how both sides used their Diplomatic, 
Informational, Economic and Military means to accomplish 
their strategic goals. For the sake of clarity, the places 
in the text where a specific aspect of DIME is discussed are 
marked [D], [I], [M], and [E], appropriately. 
1. Georgia-Russia: 1991-2003 
Since the proclamation of independence by Georgia on 
April 9 1991, the Soviet and then Russian Federation has 
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regarded Georgia as part of their exclusive zone of 
influence. Russian-Georgian relations have been dominated by 
security issues, namely the issue of border security, 
terrorism, conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the 
Russian bases on the territory of Georgia. Russia has based 
its policy towards Georgia on fueling internal instability 
in this country.248 
In 1991, there was a conflict between the anti-Russian 
President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the opposition. 
The support received from Moscow contributed to the 
Gamsakhurdia’s overthrow [D, I]. The Military Council was 
established, which almost immediately called for Eduard 
Shevardnadze to come back to the country. As a result, 
Shevardnadze became chairman of the Parliament and then in 
1992, became President of Georgia.249 
a. Conflict in South Ossetia 
In 1991, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict turned 
into open military confrontation. The Georgian troops 
entered the South Ossetia. The clashes lasted for a year. 
Despite the initial advantage of the government forces, 
Georgians had not been able to seize the capital of South 
Ossetia-Tskhinwali. Finally, the Ossetians succeeded mainly 
because of unofficial support from Moscow (money, volunteers 
from North Ossetia, and weaponry).[D, M]. Following the 
conflict, the South Ossetian Parliament asked the Russian 
State Duma for the adoption of South Ossetia in the Russian 
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Federation and joined it with North Ossetia into a single 
entity. Facing a real prospect of losing a part of its 
territory, Georgia asked the Russians about mediation. As a 
result on June 25, 1992, an agreement was signed by Eduard 
Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin according to which the 
Georgian-Russian-Ossetian peacekeepers were placed in South 
Ossetia.250 [D] 
Finally, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict 
strengthened the Russian position in Georgia, and 
permanently deprived Tbilisi of the control over part of its 
territory. 
b. Conflict in Abkhazia 
During the Georgian-Abkhazian war in years 1992-
1993, Russia has played a considerable role. The war broke 
off in August 1992, when the Georgian troops entered 
Abkhazia under the pretext of chasing the former president 
Gamsakhurdia’s supporters. Supposedly, the Georgians counted 
on a quick success. Initially, the Georgians were able to 
force the Abkhazia’s government to leave the republic’s 
capital Sukhumi, but as time passed the Georgian prospects 
of winning this war started to look unclear. Although, the 
Russians officially declared neutrality, in reality the 
Russian units stationed in the territory of Abkhazia 
supported the Abkhazian side by providing them with 
ammunition, weapons and fuel from Russia. Abkhazian forces 
had the Russian tanks T-72 and T-80. [M, I] Also, volunteers  
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from Chechnya were allowed to cross the Russian-Abkhazian 
border. These factors contributed to the decisive change in 
the strategic situation in Abkhazia. 
In September 1993, the Abkhazian forces took over 
control of the republic when they seized the capital-
Sukhumi. It can be argued that regular supplies of the 
Russian military equipment influenced the outcome of this 
conflict.251 
c. Georgia between Russia and West 
Russia’s involvement in the Georgian-Abkhazian war 
and apparent military disaster of Georgia, led to the 
reorientation of the Georgian foreign policy. Georgia 
started to build more partnership relations with Russia. 
President Eduard Shevardnadze hoped for the Russian 
assistance in restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia 
by helping to solve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. In exchange for that, Georgia committed itself to 
join the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Treaty 
of Tashkent. Both of these happened in 1993. [D, I] In 
addition, Russia was allowed to deploy its forces in three 
military bases: Wazi, Akhalkalaki, and Batumi.252 [D, M] 
The Georgian authorities quickly noticed that 
despite the more favorable attitude on the part of the 
Russians, who helped to establish a ceasefire in both break-
away republics, there was still another big Georgian problem 
unresolved-the economic crisis. In order to improve the 
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economic situation of Georgia, huge investments were 
necessary. These assets were available in the Western 
countries. Georgia’s adoption to CIS did not help the 
economy. Therefore, Tbilisi started to seek Western 
investment in the country, which in turn resulted in a 
reorientation of foreign policy and a loosening of ties with 
Russia and the CIS. Georgia sought also to improve relations 
with the neighboring countries and to get acceptance from 
the West for its policies. In March 1996, Georgia signed an 
agreement for the transit of Azeri oil by a pipeline Baku-
Supsa. Simultaneously, the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
started to be built. In addition to that, beginning in 1997, 
Georgia started to strengthen its direct ties with the West, 
as well as became one of the founders of the GUAM 
organization (Organization for Democracy and 
Development)253. 
From the standpoint of the Russian interests, the 
main concern was the rising presence of Americans in 
Georgia. The U.S. influence was reflected in Georgia’s 
accession to the NATO program PfP (Partnership for 
Peace).254 NATO countries and particularly the United States 
had begun to provide support for Georgia by providing it 
with equipment and capital. It helped reforms of Georgia's 
armed forces and adaptation to NATO standards. From a 
political standpoint, it was a clear sign of support for the 
aspirations of President Shevardnadze, who was calling for  
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withdrawal of the Russian troops from Georgia. As a 
consequence, along with improvement of the Georgia-West 
relations, the Russia-Georgia relations were deteriorating. 
At the time of the second Chechen war in 1999, 
Russia began to accuse Georgia of being a transit country 
for weapons and volunteers from Muslim countries to 
Chechnya.255 [I, D] In addition, mutual relationships 
worsened after OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, 
where the issue of the Russian troops based in Georgia was 
discussed. [D] With the support of Western countries, 
Georgia had obtained a commitment from Russia to withdraw 
two of the four Russian bases located on Georgian territory 
in Wazi and Gadauta in 2001. In reality, Russia has 
withdrawn only from the air force base in Wazi, while in the 
base in Gadauta in Abkhazia the Russian replaced the Russian 
flag with the flag of CIS peace forces.256 [M, I] 
d. Beginning of the Russian “Active Diplomacy” 
Since 1999, Russia began to pursue a policy 
towards Georgia aimed at “punishing” it for its pro-Western 
sympathies, and for a “too independent” policy. The Russian 
politicians began to declare that Russia has the right to 
launch preemptive strikes outside the country in case of the 
emergence of direct threats to Russia’s security. [I] The 
Georgian authorities read it as an unambiguous threat to 
Georgia. Since then, the Russian jets had begun flying into 
the Georgian air space-a regular Russian behavior for the 
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next several years. [M, I] The next hostile step was to 
introduce the Russian visa requirement for citizens of 
Georgia. [D, I] This obligation was, however, waived for the 
pro-Russian oriented inhabitants of the separatist republics 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.257 [I] In this way, Russia 
has limited the extremely important Georgians’ opportunities 
for travelling to work in Russia, and also indirectly 
supported the separatist tendencies within the country. This 
decision had significant social consequences because it is 
estimated about 500 thousand Georgians were working in 
Russia at that time.258 [E] Another Moscow action striking 
at the economy of Georgia was cutting off gas supplies to 
Georgia at the turn of 2000 and 2001.259 [E, I] 
2. Georgia-Russia: in the Aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution 
Once the Rose Revolution succeeded, the new Georgian 
administration of President Mikhail Saakashvili announced 
the Georgian priorities in the foreign policy. Literally, 
these were: (1) improvement of the Georgian-Russian 
relationships, (2) pro-Western orientation of the foreign 
policy, and (3) struggle for restoration of the territorial 
integrity of the country. It can be argued that the first 
two objectives were mutually exclusive.260 
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Yet at the beginning of 2004, it seemed that the 
normalization of relations between Russia and Georgia could 
be achieved. In February 2004, President Saakashvili paid 
his first foreign visit to Moscow. During this visit the 
agreement was signed about a coordination of mutual efforts 
to secure the Russian-Georgian border. Also the talks on the 
status of the Russian bases in Georgia were initiated. [D] 
This “honey-moon” in relations between both countries, 
however, did not last long. 
a. The Russia-Georgia Relationships on the 
Slippery Slope 
One of the first steps of new Georgian 
administration was seizure of control over another 
separatist region in Georgia-Ajaria. The pro-Russian regime 
of Aslan Abashidze was toppled, and the Ajaria authorities 
have committed themselves to conduct free elections in the 
region and to disarm the paramilitary groups. Of course, 
these events were not welcomed in Moscow because it lost 
another potential pressure point on Georgia. 
As it was argued earlier, one of the main foreign 
policy objectives of President Mikhail Saakashvili has been 
the integration of Georgia into NATO and the EU. From the 
Russian point of view, particularly the possible Georgian 
membership in NATO was completely contrary to the Russian 
vision of order in the South Caucasus. Therefore, Russia 
absolutely opposed this idea, unofficially calling for the 
guarantee that on Georgia’s territory, there will be no NATO 
bases. [D, I] Moscow also resisted for a long time to 
fulfill its commitment adopted at the OSCE summit in 1999, 
to withdraw its two remaining military bases from Georgia. 
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[D, M] With regards to this, however, with the support of 
the West, Georgia has achieved a big success, which was the 
agreement signed in March 2006, in Sochi. Russia committed 
to withdraw its troops from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki 
by the end of 2007. Moscow also perceived Georgia’s 
withdrawal from the Council of CIS Defense Ministers in 
February 2006, as another Georgian step aimed at the Russian 
foreign policy. Further escalation of the conflict took 
place in July 2006, when both countries carried out 
apparently provocative military maneuvers. [I, M] It can be 
argued that from that time, both countries adopted a policy 
leading to escalation of the tension. Thus, when Russia 
closed, in 2006, one of the border crossings to Georgia, 
[D, E] the Georgian response was to withdraw its agreement 
to Russia's acceptance into the World Trade Organization.261 
The culmination of the crisis in mutual relationships took 
place in September 2006, when the Georgian special services 
arrested four Russian officers and started to occupy the 
headquarters of the Russian troops in Transcaucasus. These 
officers were accused of spying for the Russian military 
intelligence (GRU) and the preparation of diversion 
actions. These events were accompanied by an anti-Russian 
campaign in the mass media, aimed at gathering more support 
for Georgia in the West.262 There was little surprise that 
the Georgian steps provoked a strong Russian reaction. The 
Russians denied any allegations and accused Georgia of 
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provocation and plans to implement a forceful solution of 
the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. [I] In 
addition, the Russians demanded that Georgia hand over the 
arrested officers, and the Russian ambassador in Tbilisi 
was summoned to Moscow. [D, I] Russians newspapers were 
citing the most prominent Russian officials, who were 
accusing Georgia of terrorism and banditry. [I] Moreover, 
some information was spread that the Russian troops were 
preparing military maneuvers close to the Georgian border 
which suggested a possibility of use of military force. [I] 
There was also some unofficial information that Russia was 
financing the Georgian opposition parties. An example of 
this has been the support which was given for Igor 
Georgadze-a sharp critic of Mikhail Saakashvili residing in 
Moscow. [I] Another example was the activity of Irakli 
Okruashvili-a former defense minister and a leader of the 
opposition “For United Georgia” party. This party 
criticized President Mikhail Saakashvili, taking advantage 
of the public dissatisfaction with the economic reforms 
conducted by Saakashvili’s administration. [I] 
Finally, under the pressure of OSCE, the EU, and 
the U.S., Georgia released the suspects and lifted the 
blockade of the Russian troops’ headquarters. 
b. Economic “Cold War” 
The release of the detained officers did not mean 
the conflict was over. Russia has used two types of 
instruments to punish Georgia. The first instrument was a 
political one. It attempted to pass a resolution condemning 
Georgia by the UN Security Council. [D] Russia failed 
because this resolution was blocked by the U.S. and Great 
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Britain. The political restrictions were also used by Russia 
domestically, and were aimed at the Georgian diaspora. These 
restrictions comprised of closing the Georgian shops and 
restaurants, police actions aimed at street salesmen or even 
registration of the Georgian children in schools. [D, I] The 
second instrument used by Russia much more successfully was 
economic sanction. Russia introduced a communication 
blockade of Georgia by closing all land, maritime and air 
passages. [E] The sanctions included banning postal 
communications. The blockade of the transfers of funds was 
also announced.263 [E] 
These Russian sanctions against Georgia were not 
the only acts of this kind in recent years. The Russians 
were not shy to use their most powerful economic stick, gas 
and oil. As was stated earlier, Georgia was fully dependent 
on Russian supplies of gas until the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline was opened. In the years 2000-2001, Moscow had 
exerted a big influence on the Georgian politics by the 
breaks in the gas supplies to Georgia, especially in 
winter. Another Russian lever on Georgia was increase in 
the gas prices sold to Georgia. The Georgian authorities 
had no good strategy to oppose this, being fully dependent 
on the Russian supplies. 
In January 2006, in the middle of heavy winter, 
the Georgians faced a critical situation. The Russian 
territory pipeline supplying gas to Georgia was blown up, 
and simultaneously the high voltage lines supplying 
electricity to Georgia were damaged. As a result of this 
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diversion, Georgia had been affected by a very serious 
energy crisis. [E, I] For several days, the whole country 
was deprived of gas and electricity which had significant 
implications for the Georgian economy. The crisis prompted 
Georgian authorities to take action to diversify energy 
sources, which resulted in the signing of contracts for the 
supply of gas from Iran and Azerbaijan, and the opening of 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum oil 
pipelines. In addition to that, Turkey and Azerbaijan 
agreed to make available for Georgia necessary supplies of 
gas, which supposedly has made this country independent 
from Russia as far as the energy supplies are concerned. 
For Russia, it was a spectacular failure, because it lost 
one of its powerful levers of pressure on Georgia.264 
Just a couple months after the energy crisis, 
Russia hit Georgia with another economic stick. This time 
Russia imposed a ban on the import and sale of Georgian 
wines, products of plant and mineral water, explaining that 
they did not meet the Russian sanitary standards. [E] 
c. When DIME is Narrowed to Pure M 
Although there is apparent tension between Russia 
and Georgia with the economic “cold war” and the military 
provocations became something natural in the mutual 
relationships, the summer of 2008 brought an unexpected 
acceleration of the hostile actions, which ultimately led to 
the military confrontation in August. 
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The war began on August 7, 2008, when the Georgian 
forces started to attack Tskhinwali, the capital of South 
Ossetia. The initial Georgian successes were quickly erased 
by a huge Russian offensive, which within two days swept 
away Georgians from South Ossetia. [M] Then, the Russians 
did not stop, but began to occupy the Georgia’s territory 
including Gori, one of the main cities. [M, I] At that time, 
it became apparent that Georgia lost this war. The reaction 
of the EU and the U.S. was contained to verbal protests 
against the Russian disproportionate use of military force. 
Only the diplomatic action carried out by French, Polish, 
Lithuanian, and Ukrainian Presidents, who visited Tbilisi 
during this period, allegedly stopped the Russian advance. 
Finally the truce was signed according to which the Russian 
troops would withdraw from the Georgian territory.265 
The most interesting question is why this war 
broke off, and what were the objectives of both sides? 
Answering these questions is entirely hypothesis, but some 
possible explanations seem to be highly consistent with the 
identified Russian foreign policy strategic goals. 
The examples for the tension between Georgia and 
Russia expanding beyond the accepted frames started to 
accumulate in the spring of 2008. The Russians were shooting 
down Georgian unmanned air vehicles (UAV) flying over 
Abkhazia, and then the same thing happened to UAVs over 
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South Ossetia.266 [M] The Georgians claimed that the reason 
for that was that Russians wanted to hide their preparations 
for a war, building shelters for tanks, improving railroads, 
etc. The shootings between the South Ossetian separatists 
and Georgian forces intensified, and the separatists started 
to shoot at the Georgian villages, which had not happened 
earlier. The Russian peacekeepers found themselves helpless 
to stop these shootings. [M, I] In July 2008, the Russian 
58th Army conducted a huge military exercise on the northern 
slopes of the Caucasus, [I, M] while at the same time, the 
Georgians with participation of the US soldiers, were 
conducting similar maneuvers on the southern side of the 
Caucasus.267 It can be argued that all these events were the 
signs of preparation for war. So, it is plausible that a 
decision on war had to be made earlier. 
If one will examine the broader political 
situation, it would be easy to notice that Russia suffered 
two major political failures in the spring of 2008. The 
first one was the declaration of independence of Kosovo, and 
the second was the unclear decision made on the NATO summit 
in Bucharest with regards to Georgia’s membership in NATO. 
Although the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was not extended 
to Georgia, NATO also did not reject the possibility of 
Georgia’s membership in the future.268 Following the 
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recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Moscow warned the 
Western countries that Russia has a right to do the same 
with the break-away republics in Georgia. [D, I] This 
declaration combined with Russia’s inability to use an 
energy weapon against Georgia, and combined with Georgia’s 
plans to join NATO, created an environment where the 
military option against Georgia could be the most tempting 
for Russia. It can be argued that the Russian strategists 
could count on multiple profits from the military action: 
(1) to punish Georgia, (2) to intimidate other countries 
from the Russian zone of influence, and force them to 
cooperate in Moscow’s favor, (3) to secure the Russian 
military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, (4) to show 
the world who is the dominant power in the Transcaucasus, 
(5) to reduce the Western influences in Georgia, (6) to use 
the victory in Georgia for strengthening its political power 
domestically. 
If the reasoning presented above is close to the 
truth, then the war in Georgia must be perceived as a part 
of a bigger Russian game. Allegedly, the Russians decided to 
use their military power against Georgia aiming primarily at 
the international audience, while Georgia itself was rather 
an additional aim. In other words, at the expense of 
Georgia, the Russians attempted to establish both their 
deterrence credibility against the U.S and the EU, and 
confirm its hegemonic position in their zone of influence. 
The unilateral recognition of independence of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia seems to prove this hypothesis.269 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The Russian authorities perceive the Transcaucasus as 
within their sphere of influence, where Russia has vital 
interests both political and economic. In particular, Russia 
is concerned about securing its southern border, preventing 
the access of international organizations like the EU and 
NATO to the region, and assuring that oil and gas from the 
Caucasus does not compete with the Russian supplies of these 
resources in international markets. 
These Russian strategic goals are contradictory to 
Georgia’s national interests. The tension between both 
countries was rising from the beginning of the existence of 
independent Georgia. The Russians, in order to weaken 
Georgia, adopted mixed measures of influence. The dominant 
Russian strategy towards Georgia was based on fueling the 
protracted conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order 
to weaken Georgia’s position. 
The Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2004 only raised the 
tension, especially when it became apparent that the 
administration of President Saakashvili was seeking 
partnership with the West rather than with Russia. In 
response to the dangerous situation, from Moscow’s point of 
view, the Russian authorities adopted gradually more and 
more aggressive countermeasures. It included some political 
and economic restrictions as well as growing support for the 
break-away republics (economic, military and informational). 
In 2008, Russia suffered some diplomatic debacles on 
the international forum (independence of Kosovo or NATO 
plans to adopt Ukraine and Georgia). In addition, the 
Georgians managed to escape from the Russian gas and oil 
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trap by building a strategic pipeline from Azerbaijan to 
Turkey. This could erode the Russian position as a supreme 
supplier of natural resources to Europe. All these facts 
together allegedly contributed to the use of military force 
as the most feasible solution. Although, there is enough 
evidence that Georgia struck first in this war, but in fact 
the situation in South Ossetia just before the war broke off 
looked already like a semi-open military conflict. 
Therefore, having in mind how high was the tension in South 
Ossetia in summer 2008, it can be argued that the war was 
rather inevitable. 
The results of the war can be labeled as disastrous for 
Georgia. It lost a lot of sympathy in the West because of 
the accusations of starting this conflict. Georgia also 
lost, probably for a long time, any possibility to solve the 
problem of separatist republics, given that the Russian 
troops are present there and the fact that Russia recognized 
independence of both break-away republics. Finally, Georgia 
probably lost its opportunity to become a NATO and the EU 
member in a foreseeable future. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THESIS ASSUMPTIONS 
As it was argued in the Introduction chapter, the 
working hypothesis adopted for this thesis was that Russia’s 
overall foreign policy is aimed at restoration for Russia a 
position among the world’s key players. This hypothesis was 
validated by a detailed examination of Russia’s foreign 
policy instruments towards three countries: Poland, Ukraine, 
and Georgia. All these countries are the former members of 
the Soviet Empire. Each of the examined countries has a 
distinct history of its relations with Russia. Poland has a 
long tradition of hostile and violent relationships with 
Russia, and was not a part of the Soviet Union. Similarly, 
Georgia resisted for a long period of time Russian 
imperialism, however, finally became a part of the USSR. 
Ukraine in turn, did not exist as independent country until 
it emerged from the smoke of the falling Soviet Union. Thus, 
examination of the Russian foreign policy towards these 
differently shaped countries was expected to reveal some 
universal patterns in the Russian foreign policy strategy. 
The relationships between Russia and the three examined 
countries were evaluated with a use of DIME model, which 
predicts that the state’s power is projected in four main 
areas: (D)iplomatic, (I)nformational, (M)ilitary, and 
(E)conomic. Within each of these areas, both conventional 
and unconventional mechanisms used by the Russian 
policymakers were identified. 
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B. THESIS FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Russia 
Balance of Power theory served as a theoretical model 
to evaluate contemporary Russia’s behavior in the 
international arena. This model predicts that both 
multipolar (before WWI) and unipolar (after Cold War) models 
of the world’s political order are likely to be unstable, 
while the bipolar (after WWII) model seems to be the most 
stable. According to the basic notion of the Balance of 
Power theory, the world’s political system has a natural 
tendency to seek a balance, thus an unbalanced power (e.g., 
USA after the Cold War) is likely to be challenged by other 
states. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed that 
Russia would not be a problem for the West any more. The 
economic and political turmoil combined with the separatist 
tendencies forced the Russian authorities to focus on 
internal problems, thus externally Russia was seeking 
support from the West rather than a confrontation. 
This situation changed once the presidential elections 
in 2000 were won by a young and active former KGB’s colonel, 
Vladimir Putin. Under his term in office, Russia adopted 
some characteristics of imperial policy, especially towards 
so called near abroad. It seems interesting that the idea of 
Eurasianism fits in the new Russian foreign policy 
principles. The idea of Eurasianism-which gained a huge 
popularity within influential political circles in Russia-is 
based on the assumption that Russia should pursue a foreign 
policy aimed at creating a multipolar world, where Russia 
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should be a leader in the Euro-Asian zone. This idea calls 
for incorporation of the former Soviet republics, and now 
independent countries, into Russia, while other states 
within the Euro-Asian zone should be either federated with 
Russia or be “friendly” to Russia. According to this notion, 
Poland is located in the area where a “friendly” to Russia 
government should be installed, while Ukraine and Georgia 
should be incorporated back into Russia. 
Thus, the main Russian foreign policy goals in the 
Russian near abroad were identified as follows. 
• Moscow has tried to achieve primary influence over 
the foreign orientations and security postures of 
the nearby states 
• Russia has endeavored to gain increasing economic 
benefits and monopolistic position through 
targeted foreign investments and strategic 
infrastructural buyouts in Eastern Europe 
• Moscow aims to convert East Europe’s overwhelming 
dependence on Russian energy supplies and economic 
investments into long-term, constant, and 
predictable intergovernmental influence 
• Russia has attempted to limit the scope and pace 
of Western institutional enlargement and 
integration, especially in the security arena in 
the European CIS states 
• Moscow is preparing to use region, especially the 
European CIS, as a springboard for rebuilding a 
larger sphere of influence and global status and 
reversing Moscow’s decline as a major 
international player 
• Moscow seeks to undercut or damage transatlantic 
relation or the Europe-America link by 
intensifying its involvement in the European 
arena. The objective is to strengthen the Europe-
Russia or ‘Eurasian’ strategic ‘pole’ vis-à-vis 
the United States and to establish a Russia-EU 
system of international security for the old 
continent. 
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2. Poland vs. Russia 
The examination of the Polish-Russian relationships 
showed that both nations have a record full of mutual 
hostility and distrust. Particularly, the last 300 years of 
Polish history is a permanent struggle against the imperial 
Russian Empire whether it was Tsarists Russia or the Soviet 
Union. 
The fall of Soviet Union created an opportunity for 
Poland to escape from the Russian orbit, and this was 
materialized in Poland’s joining NATO and the EU. This 
author believes that the Russians reconciled themselves to 
the fact that Poland became a part of the West. Even the 
proponents of Eurasianism see Poland located outside the 
boundaries of the future Russian Empire. However, Poland is 
located in a strategic place on Europe’s map, being a gate 
for Russia to Western Europe. Thus, the Russian interests in 
Poland are vast, and the Russian policy is generally aimed 
at ensuring a Polish “friendly” attitude to Russia. 
The examination of the Russian capabilities in Poland 
showed that Russia primarily uses its economic “stick” (gas 
and oil supplies) as a tool to exert influence on Poland. 
The economic capabilities are closely followed by a coherent 
informational policy which provides an explanatory function 
for the Russian strategy. The Russian informational 
capabilities in Poland are mainly based on the Russian 
ability to exploit the still existing ties and sentiments of 
the communist times, rather than for any modern and 
attractive message. The diplomatic and military measures 
have relatively smaller leverage potential, although by no 
means small. 
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Thus, it can be argued that the overall Russian 
strategy in Poland employs all DIME components, which are 
mutually supportive. The economic and informational 
capabilities are used in a highly unconventional manner and 
are strictly subordinated to the political agenda. 
3. Ukraine vs. Russia 
What differentiates Ukraine from Poland and Georgia is 
the fact that Ukraine had never been an independent state 
until as late as in 1991. Ukraine, as it emerged from the 
falling USSR, is a state deeply divided into two parts: the 
Western part, which is pro-European and nationalistic 
oriented, and the Eastern part, where pro-Russian sentiments 
are dominant. 
From the Russian perspective Ukraine is absolutely a 
key country which has to be kept within the Russian zone of 
influence. Thus, any attempts to change this status quo are 
vigorously opposed by Russia. This was the case of the 
Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine finally 
convinced the Russian authorities that Ukraine is orienting 
towards the West, so the Russians adopted some active 
measures to reverse this trend. 
The active measures encompassed mainly direct 
diplomatic and informational interference, especially right 
before the Orange Revolution succeeded. Then, Russia even 
sharpened its attitude to Ukraine using its pressures on 
Ukraine gradually more aggressively and overtly. The special 
attention in the Russian strategy has been granted both to 
the huge Russian ethnic minority in Crimea Peninsula, and to 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet basing there. The Russian 
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authorities have used these pressures on Ukraine in order to 
change the Ukrainian political choices. In addition to the 
“ethnic and military cards,” the “gas weapon” is also of use 
in the Russian hands. All these measures adopted by Russia 
can be labeled an unconventional use of DIME. Russians are 
also highly effective in taking advantage of the communist 
heritage, namely the existing ties and pro-Russian 
sympathies within the Ukrainian elites. This is especially 
apparent in the Eastern Ukraine, where the Ukrainian 
economic and political elites see the country’s future in a 
close partnership with Russia. 
4. Georgia vs. Russia 
The geopolitical location of Georgia in an ethnically 
unstable Transcaucasus region makes this country vulnerable 
to ethnic problems. The Russian authorities, who perceive 
the Transcaucasus as within their sphere of influence, 
decided to use the “ethnic card” to force Georgia to adjust 
its political agenda to the Russia’s interests. This is the 
background for the protracted ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Although the “ethnic card” was played 
very smartly by the Russians, Georgia was gradually escaping 
from the Russian zone of influence in lieu of the West. This 
process was decisively accelerated after the Rose 
Revolution. The new Georgian administration started to seek 
partnership with the Western institutions like NATO or the 
EU. 
Because the Russian strategic goals were contradictory 
to Georgia’s national interests, the tension between both 
countries was rising, mainly fueled by gradually more and 
more aggressive Moscow’s steps. It included some political 
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and economic restrictions as well as growing support for the 
break-away republics (economic, military and informational). 
This ultimately led to the military confrontation in South 
Ossetia in 2008. 
Although the first major military action in this war 
was perpetuated by the Georgia’s troops, this author 
believes that the intensifying Ossetian military 
provocations did not leave too much room for Georgia other 
than a military reaction. The military conflict was a matter 
of time and was provoked successfully which played in the 
Russian hands, who managed to accomplish their political 
goals in Georgia by military means. 
The author also argues that the decision for the 
military solution of the Georgian issue was made in Moscow 
in order to establish Russia’s deterrence credibility. After 
some international diplomatic debacles in 2008, (Kosovo or 
NATO plans to adopt Ukraine and Georgia), the Russian 
authorities decided to use Georgia as an example to show the 
Russian determination to defend its interests. If it is a 
true assumption, this strategy worked. First, the Russians 
recognized the independence of both break-away republics 
(obvious retaliation for recognition of the independence of 
Kosovo). This act practically partitioned Georgia. Second, 
the Georgian credibility was destroyed, mainly because it 
allowed itself to be provoked. As of now, this makes the 
Georgian accession to NATO and the EU hardly imaginable. 
Third, the Russians came back militarily to the 
Transcaucasus, which can be hard to overestimate from the 
political point of view. 
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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As it is argued here, the Russian foreign policy has 
adopted some characteristics of neo-imperialism. So, the 
need to counter the Russian policy is apparent. This 
particularly refers to the three examined countries. 
As of now, the main strategy of all three countries 
with regards to Russia was to seek the support from the 
West. This particularly meant to seek membership in NATO and 
the EU. 
Poland is the only examined country which accomplished 
both these goals. The Polish security strategy was based on 
the assumption that membership in these organizations would 
assure the military and economic safety of the country. 
Membership in NATO and EU can be labeled as the backbone of 
the Polish security strategy. Once in the Western 
hemisphere, Poland recognized that its safety also depends 
on having friendly countries on the Eastern side of the 
Polish borders. This constituted the basic reason for which 
Poland has actively pursued so called Eastern policy. This 
policy was based on political support given for the former 
Soviet republics, especially for Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine 
and Georgia. The democratization processes in those 
countries has been seen in Poland as positive contributions 
to the Polish national security. Particularly, Poland has 
supported the NATO and the EU aspirations of Ukraine and 
Georgia. It can be argued that Poland has been playing an 
advocacy role for both countries with regards to their 
accession to the West. This Polish policy seems to be 
optimal to strengthen national security. 
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Although, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and 
especially the weak reaction of the West, showed that 
Ukraine can potentially face the same threat in the future, 
it seems that there is no better strategy for Ukraine than 
strengthening its ties with the West. As long as the Russian 
policy is based on the imperial resentments, the Ukraine’s 
critical interest is to keep away from the Russian zone of 
influence. The Ukrainians should cooperate closely with 
Poland because it is also a Polish interest to pull Ukraine 
away from the Russian orbit, and both countries have 
significant demographic and economic potentials to force 
their political agenda. At the same time, however, seeking 
the partnership with the West should not mean cutting 
relations with Russia. This could only validate the Russian 
notion of the zero sum game which is played between Russia 
and the West, and strengthen the imperial wing internally in 
Russia. This can be difficult to keep in balance in the 
Ukrainian foreign policy, taking into account that Ukraine 
is apparently divided into two opposite parts; a strongly 
pro-Russian Eastern Ukraine and pro-European Western 
Ukraine. 
After the Russian invasion in Georgia, the prospects 
for this country are not clear. It seems that the main task 
for the Georgians is to restore their credibility within the 
Western countries. It would help Georgia to be more 
efficient in attracting Western investments, and 
subsequently to reform its economy. This should be the focal 
point for Georgia as of now. Georgia’s political objectives, 
especially the issue of the separatist republics, should not 
be abandoned; however, this problem should be managed 
cautiously in order to involve the international community 
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in solving it. Any Georgian unilateral actions are not 
likely to succeed. Georgia should also keep good relations 
with its neighbors in Transcaucasus, especially with 
Azerbaijan. Energy independence, key in this, is a critical 
factor in the Russian policy. 
Undoubtedly, Georgia is in the least advantageous 
position among the three examined countries. Being divided 
by Russia, with the Russian troops in its territory, it has 
little room for political maneuver. The Russian military 
action in Georgia and subsequent recognition of independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be, however, the issues 
which can be exploited politically in Georgia’s favor. The 
Russian actions convinced many, especially in the West, that 
Russia is not necessarily a reasonable partner. To take 
advantage of this damaged Russian image poses both an 
opportunity and a challenge for the Georgian leadership. 
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